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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the debate over settlement classes has
moved considerably beyond the "sturm und drang"inspired by the epic
settlement classes in Amchem Products, Incorporated.v. Windsor' and
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation.2 Whereas Amchem asked whether
and on what terms federal courts were authorized to approve
settlement classes, 3 and Ortiz asked whether a mandatory, limitedfund global asbestos settlement was sustainable, 4 the settlement class
issue du jour focuses on the ability of litigants to collaterally attack
6
settlements in remote forums 5 and at remote times.
Because the collateral attack problem is so vital to the sanctity
of settlement classes, the locus of the debate over the future of
settlement classes is centrally located in the issue of adequacy. Today,
it seems beyond cavil that the federal class action rule authorizes
settlement classes, even without a specific provision for settlement
classes in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, the
great rulemaking debate of the late 1990s over the possible
amendment of Rule 23(b) to include a new subdivision that would

1.
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
2.
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
3.
Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 612-13; see also Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d
610, 634-35 (3d Cir. 1996) (endorsing settlement class concept but finding dubious authority in
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for settlement classes); In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 786-804 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding
concept of settlement class but disapproving proposed settlement class on its merits); Georgine v.
Amchem Prods.; Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (approving settlement class without
discussion of concept of settlement class); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 739-40 (4th Cir.
1989) (discussing and upholding concept of settlement classes).
4.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 823-30; see also Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d
963, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding certification of limited fund mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
settlement class).
5.
State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1016-17 (Vt. 2003).
6.
Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson (In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig.), 539 U.S. 111,
112 (2003) (per curiam); see also Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for
'Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 766
(1998) (arguing that "a substantially narrower opportunity for collateral challenge" should be
adopted); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051,
1149-1181 (1996) (examining the mechanics of collateral estoppel); David Lehn, Note,
Adjudicative Retroactivity as a PreclusionProblem: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 59 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563, 563-66 (2004) (exploring retroactive collateral attack); Richard A.
Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 366 (2003)
(agreeing with the viewpoint of Kahan & Silberman, supra,that "problems of inadequacy in class
representation [should be addressed] at their source: in the rigor brought to the generation of
class judgments ... rather than through the post hoc vehicle of collateral attacks."); Patrick
Wooley, The Availability of CollateralAttack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79
TEX. L. REV. 383, 389 (2000) (maintaining that "legislators and rulemakers should not modify
current law permitting collateral attacks.").
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have specifically authorized settlement classes now seems a quaint
7
tempest in the class action teapot.
During the past two decades, the courts, practicing attorneys,
academic commentators, rulemaking committees, and interested
spectators have come a long way in the class action wars.8 In addition
to providing a rule basis for interlocutory appeal of class certification
orders in 1998, 9 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules amended Rule
23 in 2003 to add new subsections dealing with appointment of class
counsel and attorney fees.1 0 In large measure, these new provisions
are relatively unimaginative, noninnovative, and work to simply
codify existing case law.1 1 The Advisory Committee also tinkered
around the edges of settlement classes, 12 though again doing so
without fully engaging the most pressing issues relating to settlement
classes.
The Agent Orange litigation, which came before the Supreme
Court last Term,' 3 coalesced many of the long-running debates and

7.
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of
Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule
23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 462-63 (1997) (arguing in opposition to proposed promulgation of new
Rule 23(b)(4) settlement class provision as violative of the Rules Enabling Act); Linda S.
Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 615, 622-39 (1997) (arguing in support of proposed new subdivision (b)(4) settlement class
proposal).
8.
The first intensive salvos in the class action wars during the past two decades were
inspired by the infamous Georgine asbestos class action settlement. Georgine was the underlying
settlement class that eventually resulted in the Supreme Court's Amchem decision. For the
district court's approval of the Georgine settlement class, see Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 337-38. For
commentary inspired by the Georgine settlement, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The
Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class
Wars]; Roger C. Cramton, IndividualizedJustice, Mass Torts, and Settlement Class Actions: An
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995); Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps;
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1159 (1995); Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918
(1995); and Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts - Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228 (1995).
9.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A
Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97, 102-03 (2001).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g), (h).
11. See Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium and
the Blurring of CategoricalImperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 177-78 (2003) ("Although the
rule amendments at first seem like a sweeping overhaul, in reality the revisions embody the
codification of class action practice over the past thirty-six years.").
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (adding, among other things, a requirement that the court may
approve settlements "only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement, voluntary
dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate" and giving plaintiffs a second
opportunity to opt-out of the class).
13. Dow Chem. Co v. Stephenson, 59. U.S. 111 (2003).
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problems with settlement classes, 14 including problems relating to
attorney and judicial conduct in negotiating and finalizing class action
settlement, 15 adequacy of representation, and the possibility of
collateral attack. 16 And, because the Supreme Court split over the
issue and failed to ultimately address or decide the important
settlement class issues in that appeal, the future of settlement classes
remains substantially problematic, troubling, and uncertain.1 7 The
most important question that all actors in the system want answered
is: will the settlement stand for all time? Unfortunately, the answer
to this question has been left vague and doubtful by the Supreme
Court's troubling deadlock.
Into this jurisprudential miasma, then, the possibility of
subsequent collateral attack looms as the singlemost threatening
challenge for the resolution of aggregate disputes through the class
action mechanism. In this context, the core issue of adequacy has
moved to center stage in the ongoing debate over class action
jurisprudence.
This paper advances three very simple but important
contentions. First, courts and litigants-meaning both plaintiff and
defense counsel-do a very poor job of ensuring adequacy of
representation at the front end of class action litigation. This is true
both in situations where the parties are seeking certification of either
a litigation class or a conditional class. Second, for a variety of
reasons, courts do a fairly poor job of ensuring adequacy of

14. To be sure, numerous other class action developments percolating in the federal
appellate courts also embody cutting-edge issues in class action litigation, including, but not
limited to, problems relating to certification of mandatory punitive damage classes under Rule
23(b)(1)(B). E.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
15. For commentary flagging the problems inherent in class counsel's representation in
class action litigation, see Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 8, passim; John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 passim (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 passim (1986); and John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 17-18, 20.23. For critical commentary relating to the role of the
judiciary in supervising class action settlements, see Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in
Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986) and Jack B.
Weinstein, A View From the Judiciary, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1957 (1992).
16. Problems relating to intrasystem and intersystem collateral attack of settlement classes
are not new on the class action landscape. E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S.
367, 377-85 (1996); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1004 (1999); see also Kahan & Silberman, supra note 6, at 765; 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
130.07[3] (3d ed. 1997).
17. See Nagareda, supra note 6, at 316-33 (commenting on the Court's "missed opportunity"
in the Stephenson Agent Orange appeal).
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representation at the time of the approval of settlement-only classes
under Rule 23(e) on the back end of class litigation. Third, these
systemic failures are a grave mistake, because adequacy of
representation is significant in class action litigation18 in important
ways that do not necessarily matter in ordinary litigation.
To put the case simply, courts pay lip service to the concept of
adequate representation but fail to robustly engage in any meaningful
inquiry to establish the existence of such adequate representation.
For judges, the adequacy inquiry usually is the least-rigorously
examined requirement for certification, either for litigation or for
settlement classes. Instead, courts routinely wave their blessings over
class counsel and proposed class representatives 19 and presumptively
20
make findings of adequacy on nonexistent or scant factual showings.
As a consequence of these dual failures, both at the front end
and the back end of class action litigation, courts and the parties
before them set the stage for subsequent collateral attack, which often
occurs many years later. With the passage of time, courts in distant
forums or after lengthy periods of time must re-examine questions
relating to adequacy of representation and reconstruct such findings
years after the initial inquiry, often utilizing an exceedingly poor
factual record. As will be discussed below, the collateral attack
against the Agent Orange settlement is the poster-child for this precise
set of problems.
It would seem, then, that the future of settlement classes is
imperiled to the extent that courts and litigants lack sufficient
gravitas about the adequacy inquiry. Because I believe that the
adequacy inquiry is so central to the durability of negotiated
settlements, I argue for a more robust, meaningful set of standards to

18. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373 (2000) (observing that the
Court "may develop [the concept of'adequacy of representation'] as a due process limitation upon
the ability of class counsel to resolve the legal rights of absent or non-consenting class
members"); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 571, 571 (1997) (noting that "courts and commentators have often assumed that adequate
representation-rather than an individual opportunity to be heard-is the touchstone of due
process.").
19. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff's Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations For Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 66 (1991) ('To be sure, courts already have power, in theory, to enforce the typicality and
adequacy requirements. In practice, however, the courts tend to play a passive role, focusing on
questions of typicality and adequacy only when they are specifically raised by defendants.").
20. See, e.g., Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding
that the district court erred in "adopting a presumption that the class representatives and their
counsel are adequate in the absence of specific proof to the contrary" and thus "improperly
shifted the burden of proof to the defendants ....).
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govern courts in the adequacy determination. Furthermore, I also
urge a more robust, vigorous judicial scrutiny of the adequacy
requirement
to ensure this requirement
is actually, not
presumptively, satisfied. In short, the best way to make settlement
classes attack-proof is to ensure adequate representation at the outset
of class litigation and meaningfully convince a judicial officer that
interests of absent class members are actually protected from attorney
21
self-dealing and other objectionable conduct.
My argument for taking adequacy more seriously also is
grounded in my belief that modern class action litigation, and
particularly modern aggregative mass tort litigation, has come to
resemble a private law dispute resolution paradigm that arrogates
immense powers to both private parties and an array of judicial
surrogates.
As I have argued elsewhere, this private dispute
resolution paradigm resembles nothing so much as private legislation
with wide-reaching effects, carrying the imprimatur of judicial
oversight and approval, but it is frequently accompanied by troubling
questions about fairness, adequate representation, and the subtle
23
merger of legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.
As I remain unconvinced that this is a desirable trend, it seems
to me that a more robust adequacy requirement has become
increasingly imperative in order to temper, restrain, or check the
possible excesses and abuses of an unlegislated private aggregative
dispute resolution model.
In Part I of this piece, I survey the adequacy issues that arise
in the context of litigation classes. This portion of the paper addresses
the situation where a proposed class action is certified upfront, with
an eye towards the actual trial of the case. In this context, I explain
how and why litigants and judges do a fairly poor job of ascertaining
the true adequacy of representation, with respect to both the class
counsel and the proposed class representatives. As a consequence, I

21. The Fifth Circuit, I believe, correctly identified and understood this set of principles in
its Compaq Computer decision:
In sum, the district court's "presumption" of adequate class representation "in the
absence of any specific proof to the contrary" is reversible error on two grounds. First,
it inverts the requirement that the party seeking certification bears the burden of
proving all elements of rule 23(a). Second, it effectively abdicates-to a self-interested
party-the court's duty to ensure that the due process rights of the absent class
members are safeguarded.
Compaq Computer, 257 F.3d at 482.
23. Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm,33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 415 (1999).
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argue that front end determinations of adequacy typically provide
inadequate insulation from subsequent collateral attack.
In Part II, I survey the problems of the adequacy determination
in the parallel universe of settlement classes. In this section, I provide
a brief historical overview of the problems of settlement classes, with a
focus on the development of the concept of the settlement class. In
addition, I also address special adequacy issues that have arisen in
the context of settlement classes.
The point of this discussion is to suggest that adequacy issues
in the context of settlement classes arise too late in the development of
litigation to address the core concerns of the adequacy requirement. I
argue that back end determinations of adequacy in settlement classes
typically are pro forma, cursory, and predetermined, and therefore
they provide no meaningful content to the adequacy requirement.
Similar to the problems relating to the adequacy determination for
litigation classes, the adequacy determination in the context of
settlement classes is problematic because these meaningless
determinations of adequacy set the stage for subsequent collateral
attack.
In Part III, I briefly discuss the Agent Orange settlement class
and the resulting collateral attack, up through the Supreme Court
appellate litigation. I contend that the Agent Orange fiasco embodies
all the core problems relating to the adequacy inquiry, including both
lame front end and back end adequacy determinations. In addition,
the Agent Orange settlement class provides a precise illustration of
the types of inadequate assessments of adequacy that occur during the
course of class action litigation. In short, adequacy inquiries that
occurred throughout the Agent Orange litigation are not only
emblematic of what most courts do but also emblematic of what courts
and litigants ought not to do.
Part -V of this paper is prescriptive. In this portion of the
paper I make a number of suggestions for standards that would
ensure actual adequacy in both litigation and settlement classes. I
contend that establishing proper adequacy at the front end of class
litigation-as opposed to courts utilizing solely back end
determinations-is the most appropriate method for ensuring the
fairness of a class action trial or settlement.
My conclusions regarding the importance of the adequacy
inquiry stem from a collection of beliefs about the nature, purpose,
and functions of class action litigation. The single most important
feature of class action litigation is that it is representationallitigation.
This basic understanding distinguishes class litigation from ordinary
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bipolar litigation or even simple aggregated litigation such as
24
consolidated cases.
The fact that class litigation is representational litigation
compels the further conclusion that class litigation is undergirded by
serious due process concerns. 2 5
These due process concerns are
largely absent in bipolar litigation or consolidated cases, where
individual litigants are consciously present to oversee the conduct of
the litigation and the actions of their own attorneys. In contrast, the
central due process concern that is manifest in class action litigation is
the protection of the interests of absent class members, who are not
actually present in the litigation to oversee the resolution of their own
claims. 26 And, as academic commentators have consistently and
urgently argued, absent class members need protection both from
their own class counsel, who may be tempted to engage in self-dealing,
as well as their own class representatives, who may not exercise
sufficient independent control over the litigation to prevent breaches
of duty to the class.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 itself embodies numerous
due process protections in several provisions: (1) the early
interposition of a judicial officer in the litigation, to ensure that due
process protections are in place; 27 (2) the requirement for an early
determination that the proposed action is suitable to be maintained as
a class action; 28 (3) the requirement for a judicial finding of both
adequacy of the class representatives as well as of the proposed class
counsel; 29 (4) the requirement of notice to class members in the Rule
23(b) class categories; 30 (5) the opportunity for exclusion from the Rule
23(b)(3) class; 31 (6) the requirement for notice and a hearing in
settlement classes, with an opportunity for a back end opt-out; 32 (7)
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42 (providing the rule for consolidation of actions).
25. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-814 (1985); Diane W. Hutchinson,
Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 488-91 (1983);
Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1192, 1198 (1982); see
also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 37 (1940) (setting forth due process concerns in
representational litigation, although not in the context of a Rule 23 class action).
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee's note ("[This sub-section] recognizes that
the primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from appointment as class counsel, is to
represent the best interests of the class. The rule thus establishes the obligation of class counsel,
an obligation that may be different from the customary obligation of counsel to individual
clients."); see also Compaq Computer, 257 F.3d at 482.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
28. Id.
29. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (g)(1)(B).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A), (B).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1), (3).
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the requirement of judicial approval before a class action may be
dismissed, compromised, or otherwise settled; 33 (8) the requirement
that settling parties report any side-deals made in connection with
any settlement, compromise, or dismissal of a class action; 34 (9) the
opportunity for objectors to present objections to proposed class action
dismissals, compromises, or settlements;3 5 and (10) the requirement of
36
judicial scrutiny and approval of attorney fee awards.
Due process issues are the single most important feature of
class litigation, and adequacy of representation looms over the entire
debate. 37 Without adequate representation-and without adequate
representation from the onset of proposed class litigation-the other
due process protections embedded in class litigation are unavailing.
II.

ADEQUACY ISSUES IN LITIGATION CLASSES

Since the late 1980s, at least, federal courts began to
distinguish the concepts of litigation classes from the concept of
settlement classes.38
The differences between so-called litigation
classes and settlement classes primarily relate to the timing of the
class certification determination,
the intention behind the
certification, and the standards for certification. As will be discussed
below, the differences between litigation classes and settlement
classes are pertinent to the adequacy determination and actually
40
serve to exacerbate many problems relating to this determination.
Generally speaking, a litigation class is a class that is certified
upfront, or as soon as practicable after filing the case. 41 Litigation

33.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A).

34.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

35.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(A).

36.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h).

37.

See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 316.17 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see

also 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:21, at 408 (4th ed.

2002) ("This [adequacy] prerequisite, essential to meet due process standards, must be satisfied
at all stages of a class action, because the final judgment in a class action is binding on all those
whom the court determines are members of the class.") (citations omitted).
38. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing and
approving concept of the settlement class); see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (generally endorsing the concept of
settlement classes but questioning the appropriate standards for their certification).
40. See infra Part III.
41. Until December 1, 2003, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(A) provided that a
proposed class action needed to be certified as such "as soon as practicable" after the filing of the
lawsuit. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (repealed 2003). After December 1, 2003, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) has
been modified to specify that a class action should be certified "at an early practicable time." It
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classes are certified with an eye towards actually trying the class, in
contrast to settlement classes, which are certified for the sole purpose
of providing a framework for counsel to move forward with settlement
42
negotiations.
A court may certify a settlement class at any time-after the
attorneys file a proposed class action, during proceedings, or at the
back end, after counsel have negotiated a settlement. Indeed, in the
most extreme and controversial variation of the settlement class
posture, counsel may simultaneously seek class certification of a
settlement class concurrent with a motion for approval of a settlement
under Federal Rule 23(e).4 3 In this variation, the court previously
even would not have reviewed or certified the proposed class.
The major jurisprudential debate during the mid-1990s
concerned whether the standards for certification of settlement classes
44
differed from those required for certification of litigation classes.
The Supreme Court settled this argument in its Amchem decision,
indicating that except for the manageability requirement in Rule
23(b)(3) classes, settlement classes needed to satisfy the same
certification requirements as litigation classes. 45 The significance of
Amchem, then, for the purposes of this paper, is that both litigation
classes and settlement classes must satisfy the same Rule 23(a)
requirement for adequacy.
This section focuses on a discussion of how courts and litigants
typically implement the adequacy requirement in situations where
class counsel seeks certification of a litigation class. The purpose of
this discussion is to illustrate that neither counsel nor the courts take
the adequacy inquiry very seriously, and both typically fail to develop

should be noted that the old version of the rule made no mention of class certification; the new
version of the rule does so. See FED. R. C1V. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (as amended Dec. 1, 2003).
42. Further complicating this schema is the possibility that proposed classes may be
conditionally or provisionally certified. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). If a court conditionally
certifies a class, it must "finally" certify the class at some subsequent point in the litigation and
prior to final judgment.
43. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e). The objectors in the Georgine settlement class argued that this is
the sequence of events that led to the Georgine settlement: that is, that the request for approval
of the settlement class was simultaneously filed with the proponents' request that the court
certify the class. The objectors further argued that this request for simultaneous certification
and settlement approval was an illegitimate procedure. Notwithstanding the objector's version
of events, the district court in Philadelphia previously had certified the Georgine class prior to
the motion for approval of the settlement under Rule 23(e). Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 157
F.R.D. 246, 261 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
44. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618, 634 (3d Cir. 1996)
(suggesting the proposition that settlement classes had to satisfy the exact same standards for
certification as litigation classes); In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 799 (same).
45. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
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a sufficient record to support a finding of adequacy. This discussion
sets up the following proposition, explored in the next section, that the
problems of a weak adequacy determination for litigation classes are
46
further exacerbated in the context of settlement classes.
It is well-received hornbook law that a finding of adequacy is a
47
threshold requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a)(4).
The adequacy requirement "embraces both the competence of the legal
counsel of the representatives and the stature and interest of the
named parties themselves. '48 Therefore, the proponents requesting
class certification 49 carry the burden of demonstrating two separate
propositions: the adequacy of class counsel and the independent
50
adequacy of the proposed class representatives.
A. Adequacy of Class Counsel
1. The Hornbook Version
Historically as well as currently, courts repeatedly have stated
that the general standard for determining the adequacy of class
counsel is that "counsel must be qualified, experienced, and generally
able to conduct the litigation." 51 In fleshing out the parameters of
46. See infra Part III.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if .... (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." Id; see 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1765-1770, at 262-405 (2d ed. 1986); 5 MOORE'S, supra note 16,
23.25; 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 37, §§ 3:21-3:28, at 408-440.
48. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 47, § 1766, at 297-98 (citation omitted); see also Amchem
Prods., 521 U.S. at 626 n.20 ("The adequacy heading also factors in competency and conflicts of
class counsel ....[W]e decline to address adequacy-of-counsel issues discretely in light of our
conclusions that common questions of law or fact do not predominate and that the named
plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the interests of this enormous class.").
49. There is some debate concerning which party carries the burden of demonstrating
adequacy. The majority position reflects the proposition that the proponents seeking class
certification carry the burden to demonstrate both types of adequacy. See Berger v. Compaq
Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The district court unquestionably adopted
an incorrect legal standard by stating that '[tihe adequacy of the putative representatives and of
plaintiffs' counsel is presumed in the absence of specific proof to the contrary.' This is error; the
party seeking certification bears the burden of establishing that all requirements of rule 23(a)
have been satisfied." (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1996) and
citing Falcon v. Gen. Tel. Co., 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds by 450 U.S.
1036 (1981) as "not to the contrary")). A minority of courts have held that the party challenging
class certification has the burden of proving the inadequacy of the named representatives. For a
discussion of this debate, see 5 MOORE'S, supranote 16, 23.25[3][c].
50. 5 MOORE'S, supra note 16, 23.25[3][a].
51. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 37, § 3:21, at 408; see also 5 MOORE'S, supra
note 16, 23.25[5][a](reciting exact same standard); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 47, § 1769.1,
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these
criteria,
courts
have
considered
class
counsel's
5 2-- including counsel's record in current and other cases5 3
competence
-counsel's
particular expertise, 54 and counsel's resources. 55
In
addition to assessing counsel's competence, courts also will examine
counsel's possible conflicts of interest with the class5 6 and counsel's
history of "ethical" conduct. 57 Finally, some courts apparently have
tempered these requirements, holding that excessive litigiousness is
not a factor that will render class counsel inadequate. 58
2.

Practical Reality

Notwithstanding the hornbook version of the standards for the
adequacy of class counsel and the smattering of cases that have
considered and applied these standards, the practical reality of the
adequacy determination in most class certification settings is radically
different.
In reality, most courts routinely, reflexively, and
presumptively certify proposed class counsel as adequate 59 without a
sufficiently probing inquiry. 60 In the modern literature, one has to look
long and hard to find cases in which class counsel have been deemed
inadequate to represent the class. 6 1
at 375 (same). All three treatises collect numerous cases repetitively reciting this general
standard.
52. 5 MOORE'S, supranote 16, 23.25[5] [b].
53. Id. 23.25[1[b][i].
54. Id. 23.25[5][b][ii].
55. Id. 23.25[5][b][iii]
56. Id. 23.25[5][e].
57. Id. 23.25[5][d].
58. Id. 23.25[5][c].
59. See 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 37, § 3:24, at 417-18 ("In reaching a
determination concerning vigorous prosecution of the action on behalf of the class, courts
consider the competence and experience of class counsel, attributes which will most often be
presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary."); see also id. § 3:42, at 530-31 ("Class counsel
must, of course, be competent, but such competency is properly presumed at the outset of
litigation, in the absence of specific proof to the contrary by the defendant.") (citation omitted).
60. See, for example, In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 461 n.12 (N.D.
Ala. 2003) (citation omitted), where the district court made the following remarkable admission:
"At the class certification hearing, the court announced that it had no questions about the
adequacy of counsel. However, the court is somewhat concerned about counsel's refusal or
neglect to address the court's stated concerns about intraclass conflicts and the suggestion that
subclasses appeared necessary." Although the court held class counsel adequate, the court
denied the motion for class certification because the proposed class presented "the occasional
extreme case where a conflict of [interest among class members of] this type is too great and
simply dominates the landscape too completely to ignore." Id. at 463. The court further concluded
that "[it] could not rely on the plaintiffs' counsel to help manage the class and subclasses that
would be created." Id. at 465 (citation omitted).
61. This phenomenon is even more pronounced in state class action litigation, where courts
seem to pay even less attention to the adequacy requirement. I could find only one Texas class
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Neither Rule 23 nor the cases relating to adequacy provide
guidance for proving adequacy of class counsel.
Consequently,
attorneys have evolved various practices in attempting to satisfy this
burden. At one end of the spectrum, some counsel make no proffer at
all of their own adequacy, but they instead merely argue this pointin conclusory fashion-as part of the more general argument in
support of class certification. 62 Other attorneys make at least some
attempt at an evidentiary offer of proof of adequacy. This may come in
the form of an affidavit from the proposed class counsel, or a
photocopy of the class counsel's entry in Martindale Hubbell or some
similar law firm publication, typically attached as an exhibit to the
motion for class certification. In some rare instances where multiple
attorneys are proposed as class counsel, the attorneys may call one
another as witnesses to provide testimony in support of their own
adequacy.
While such evidentiary offers of proof are commendable, the
general problem is that these offers tend to be self-serving,
incomplete, or insufficiently illuminating. For example, self-serving
affidavits that list the class actions in which proposed class counsel
has been "involved" virtually never indicate how counsel developed,
litigated, or settled those actions, or provide the terms of such a
settlement. Proffers of adequacy, regardless of their form, virtually
never indicate whether proposed class counsel have sufficient
resources, financial as well as logistical, to support full-scale complex
litigation. Needless to say, class counsel never ruminate over their
own actual or possible conflicts of interest with the class
representatives, absent class members, or other class counsel. In a
similar vein, proposed class counsel obviously have no incentive to
disclose their personal involvement in any disqualifying ethical snafus
during the course of their professional career.
Compounding these significant gaps in information, courts
rarely probe beyond the written page or spoken testimony (if offered)
of the attorneys, and they seem almost totally disinterested in making

action decision holding class counsel inadequate. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden, 108
S.W.3d 385, 399-400, 404 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding class counsel inadequate because counsel
repleaded complaint to eliminate claims, causing prejudicial res judicata effect for class
members). This dearth of cases relating to adequacy of class counsel is striking in a high-volume
class action jurisdiction.
62. I have seen class counsel satisfy this burden at class certification hearings by simply
stating to the court some variation of this theme: "And of course, class counsel are competent to
represent the class." On this representation alone, any number of courts have granted their
blessings to class counsel.
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further inquiries of proposed class counsel.6 3 Thus, because the judge
virtually never examines proposed class counsel, the burden of
probing adequacy issues shifts to the party opposing class
certification, most typically defense counsel. Yet the class opponent
faces considerable obstacles in making the case for inadequacy, not
the least of which is the inability or disinclination to call proposed
class counsel as a witness for examination on adequacy issues. And, if
class counsel offers proof of adequacy by affidavit or a Martindale
Hubbell entry, this leaves defense counsel with the problem of the
inability to cross-examine a paper record. 64 Finally, it is well-nigh
impossible for the party opposing the class to discover information
concerning the class counsel's resources or refuting his or her ability
to finance and logistically support a complex, sustained litigation.
3. Possible Explanations for the Inadequate Assessment of Class
Counsel's Adequacy
My argument is based on the notion that in the real world of
class certification proceedings, most courts do not take the adequacy
inquiry very seriously and virtually always presumptively ratify
whomever "steps up to the plate," no matter how inexperienced,
ethically challenged, underfinanced, or ill-prepared. There may be
several possible explanations for this phenomenon, some of which I
explore below.
First, it may very well be that most attorneys who file and
pursue class action litigation easily satisfy the stated standards for a
finding of adequate class counsel. If this is indeed the case, it would
explain the courts' literal and figurative inattention to this part of the
class certification process. While I am willing to concede that this is
generally true, my problem is with the universe of proposed class
actions where it is not. In these cases, courts exhibit the same
inattention and disinterest as in those cases involving qualified
litigators, and they in essence give a free ride to proposed class
counsel who should not be ratified to represent the class.
Second, the disinclination of courts to rigorously scrutinize
proposed class counsel may be explained in large measure by an
ingrained tradition of professional courtesy and civility. The prospect

63. Over a fifteen-year span, during the vast number of class certifications I have attended,
I have never once witnessed a judge who asked class counsel any questions at all bearing on the
issues relating to class counsel's adequacy. This includes class certification hearings where the
adequacy of class counsel was in issue.
64. In addition, the party opposing class counsel faces significant obstacles in conducting
precertification discovery concerning the adequacy of proposed class counsel.
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of having to evaluate professional competence is painful; both judges
and even opposing counsel are uncomfortable passing judgment on
another attorney's career. 65 Indeed, in some class action proceedings,
judges have found the prospect of a defense counsel examination of
proposed class attorney so distasteful that the judges refuse to permit
such an examination.
Third, the cursory, presumptive, rubber stamping of the
adequacy of class counsel usually is the result of plaintiff-drafted class
certification orders. Once a judge determines to certify a class, many
state judges typically invite class counsel to draft the court's
certification order. Not surprisingly, plaintiff-drafted certification
orders recite, in rote conclusory fashion, that the court finds class
counsel adequate to represent the class. This is typically set forth
without any findings of fact. Although defense counsel may in these
circumstances also submit a defense version of the certification order,
by the time the court has informed the parties it intends to certify the
class, the adequacy issue has been rendered virtually moot, and the
defense is unlikely to counter with an order denying adequacy of class
counsel even if defense counsel believes there are pertinent issues
surrounding adequacy.
4.

Consequences of the Class Counsel Adequacy Free Pass

As most courts engage in a virtual presumption of class counsel
adequacy, the issue is rarely raised, examined, probed, or explored
during the certification process. Consequently, because courts
routinely rubber stamp approval of proposed class counsel, judges are
inattentive to serious representation problems that may unfold during
subsequent class proceedings. The most serious examples of these
subsequent problems include lack of dilig+ence in prosecuting the
action, ineffective assistance of counsel as a consequence of
inexperience or underfinancing, abandonment of parties or claims,
self-dealing, collusion or other ethical improprieties, and most
importantly, the conduct and conclusion of settlement negotiations.

65. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 461 (N.D. Ala. 2003) ('The
fact that defendants do not challenge the abilities of plaintiffs' counsel does not surprise the
court."). There are limits to this professional courtesy, however, and if defense counsel have
sufficient evidence of inadequacy of proposed class counsel, they will at least make an attempt to
make the case if it requires examining proposed class action.
70.

1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 37, § 3:24, at 417.
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B. Adequacy of the Class Representatives
Problems relating to the assessment of adequacy of class
counsel are replicated in the twin requirement of a finding of
adequacy of the class representative. While most courts pay at least
ritual obeisance to the concept that a class must be represented by
adequate counsel, however, many courts virtually ignore the class
representative altogether. This phenomenon is striking.
1. The Hornbook Version
Not surprisingly, the leading academic treatises are somewhat
in disagreement concerning the applicable standards for evaluating
the adequacy of class representatives. Generally, Newberg on Class
Actions-the leading plaintiff-oriented treatise-places an emphasis
on the competency of class counsel. 70 In Newberg's class action
universe, if the proposed class representative has no conflict of
interest with absent class members (which Newberg suggests is the
usual case), then the appropriate focus is on the adequacy of class
7 1
counsel to the exclusion of any inquiry into the class representative.
In essence, the Newberg approach distills the class
representative adequacy inquiry to the simple question: "Does the
class representative have a conflict of interest with the absent class
members?" If the answer is "no," then Newberg remains untroubled
by any other attributes of the proposed class representative. 72 The
Newberg treatise suggests that class action jurisprudence does not
require inquiry into any aspect of a proposed class representative's
knowledge, character, circumstances, motives, abilities, or other
characteristics.
Clearly, the effect of the Newberg approach is to severely
truncate any inquiry into the quality and nature of the purported class
representative. This method is a version of the potted-plant theory of
the class representative; as long as the potted plant is conflict-free, its
71. Id. ("[I]n . . . the usual case when the plaintiff has no conflict [of interest] with the
class, courts focus primarily on class counsel, not on the plaintiff, to determine if there will be
vigorous prosecution of the class action. Plaintiffs are generally laypeople and they are not
expected to prosecute their own action or that of the class."); see also Comment, The Class
Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs,68 Nw. U. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (1974) ("[T]he
single most important factor considered by the courts in determining the quality of the
representatives' ability and willingness to advocate the cause of the class has been the caliber of
the plaintiffs attorney.").
72. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 37, § 3:26, at 433-34. In somewhat garbled
prose, the Newberg treatise seems to conclude that as long as class counsel are competent and
the class representative is free from conflicts, then it is not necessary to probe into any
"individual circumstances, attributes, or motives of the purported class representative." Id.
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appropriate role is to remain mute, provide background foliage, and do
nothing more. The Newberg approach has been endorsed by many
courts that routinely recite that the competency of class counsel is the
single most important factor in assessing adequacy. In the extreme
version of this method, some have suggested that the caliber of class
counsel is the only thing that matters; the adequacy of the class
73
representative is of no consequence at all.
In contrast to Newberg, the two other federal practice treatises
-which are in agreement--set forth an entirely different concept
regarding the adequacy of a class representative. The Wright and
Miller treatise encapsulates this enhanced standard as follows:
"[W]ith regard to the necessary qualities for the named representative
parties, the general standard is that the representatives must be of
such a character as to assure the vigorous prosecution or defense of
the action so that the members' rights are certain to be protected. 74
In order to assess the adequacy of the named representatives, courts
have looked to factors such as their honesty, conscientiousness, and
other affirmative personal qualities. If the representative displays a
lack of credibility regarding the allegations being made or a lack of
knowledge or understanding concerning what the suit is about, then
the court may conclude that Rule 23(a)(4) is not satisfied. This inquiry
into the knowledge of the representative is to ensure that the party is
not simply lending his name to a suit entirely controlled by the class
attorney; the named party must be an adequate representative in
75
addition to having adequate counsel.
Moore's Federal Practice treatise is in substantial agreement
with Wright and Miller, noting that "[t]he class representative acts as
a fiduciary for the entire class," and as a fiduciary, "the class
76
representative owes the putative class a duty of loyalty."
In this enhanced view of the adequacy requirement for
proposed class representatives, it is legitimate, if not necessary, to
examine an entire array of attributes of the class representative.
These include whether: (1) the proposed class representative has any
73. Professor Issacharoff has endorsed this position. See Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages,
Inc. v. Waterin Hole, Inc., No. 95- 03809, 1997 WL 124110, at *2, *4 (Tex. App. Mar. 20, 1997)
(explaining Professor Issacharoff's position while reversing class certification and disagreeing
with his position regarding standards for adequacy of class representatives); see also Macey &
Miller, supra note 19, at 6 (arguing for the centrality of the class attorney's role and arguing that
class representatives not be required at all: "We believe that the costs of requiring an actual
named plaintiff greatly outweigh the benefits. Accordingly, we recommend that actual, identified
named plaintiffs not be required in large-scale, small-claim litigation.").
74. 7A WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 47, § 1766, at 302-311.
75.

Id.

76.

5 MOORE'S, supra note 16,

23.25[2][a].
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interests that are in conflict with or antagonistic to other class
members; 77 (2) the class representative is subject to a unique
defense; 78 (3) the class representative is closely affiliated with class
counsel; 79 (4) the class representative has claims against the
defendant other than the class claims;8 0 (5) the class representative is
familiar with the action;8 1 (6) the class representative has ceded
control over the litigation to class counsel;8 2 (7) the class
representative is of advanced age, in ill health, or suffering from other
disability;8 3 (8) the class representative has a sufficient financial stake
in the outcome of the litigation;8 4 (9) the class representative has the
ability to finance the litigation;8 5 and (10) the class representative is of
sufficient moral character to represent a class, including whether the
representative displays traits of honesty, credibility, and purity of
86
motive.
Although these criteria have been developed through a series of
judicial decisions, in the vast majority of reported class certification
decisions most courts display scant acknowledgement of these
requirements, focusing instead on the single inquiry of whether the
class representative has any conflict of interest with class members.
For our purposes, however, it is important to consider that an
appreciation of the class representative as a fiduciary for the interests
of the absent class members invites inquiry into all these categories of
information.
2. Practical Reality
The practical reality of how the judicial system deals with the
adequacy of class representatives is nicely encapsulated by a fine
appreciation of the divergent views presented by Newberg on Class
77. Id. 23.25[2][b].
78. Id. 23.25[2][b][iv].
79. Id. 23.25[21[b][vi].
80. Id. 23.25[2[ib][vii].
81. Id. 23.25[2][c][ii].
82. Id. 23.25[2][c][ii].
83. Id. 23.25[2][c][iii].
84. Id. 23.25[2][c][iv].
85. Id. 23.25[2][d].
86. Id. 23.25[2][e].
90. This is certainly the practice in Texas state courts, where at least one intermediate
court of appeals reversed a class certification for lack of adequacy where the class
representatives failed to appear at the class certification hearing. Southwestern Bell Yellow
Pages, Inc. v. Waterin Hole, Inc., No. 95- 03809, 1997 WL 124110, at *3-*4 (Tex. App. Mar. 20,
1997). Such was the court's finding even though the class representatives had given prior
deposition testimony. Id.
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Actions, Wright's FederalPracticeand Procedure,and Moore's Federal
Practice. Simply put, plaintiffs' class counsel heartily endorse the
Newberg view while defense counsel subscribe to the Wright and
Moore's Federal Practice view. These divergent approaches have
practical consequences as to how each side prepares for and presents
supporting evidence during the class certification process.
a. Plaintiff'sApproach to Proving Up Adequacy
Because many class counsel subscribe to the classrepresentative-as-potted-plant theory,
some counsel believe it is
unnecessary to make any evidentiary proffer of the adequacy of the
class representatives beyond the conclusory assertion of the truth of
the matter. In the olden days, because most courts routinely accepted
such conclusory assertions, the actual production of the class
representative was not considered necessary to a finding of adequacy.
This was especially true in jurisdictions where class certification was
decided on the pleadings and without an evidentiary hearing, and it
remains true in those jurisdictions that do not conduct evidentiary
class certification hearings.
As some federal and state courts have tightened class
certification requirements and come to require evidentiary hearings in
the last decade, class counsel have become conscious of the desirability
-if not the necessity--of making the class representative testify at
the class certification hearing. 90
It is now common for class
representatives to be deposed prior to certification, and some
sophisticated plaintiffs' law firms will also seek to ensure the
adequacy of their class representatives by furnishing those
representatives with a description of the nature of class actions and
their fiduciary duties. 9 1
The plaintiffs strategic approach to proving up the class
representative's adequacy is simple: it proceeds along the lines of "the
less said, the better."From this perspective, class counsel's goal is to
get the class representative on and off the witness stand as quickly as
possible. In addition, in situations where the class representative is
actually adequacy-challenged, class counsel desires to avoid any
probing inquiries into the class representative's knowledge,
understanding, personal attributes, solicitation issues, or any other
characteristics.

91. The San Francisco law firm Lief, Cabraser routinely engages in this laudable practice.
The signed information sheets subsequently are offered as exhibits supporting the adequacy of
the class representatives at the time of the motion for class certification.
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The plaintiffs offer of proof of adequacy proceeds along
predictable lines. Class representatives are usually examined about
the representative's personal history, the extent and nature of their
injuries, and any information supporting good character (whether or
not relevant to the issue of serving as a class fiduciary) The class
representative will then be asked whether he or she is willing to
vigorously prosecute the lawsuit on behalf of the class (yes) and
whether the class representative has any conflicts of interest (no). In
giving testimony, class representatives frequently manifest every
indicia of careful prehearing testimony preparation, including
coaching. Class counsel typically employ leading questions to steer
the witness through this direct examination and, more often than not,
conclude the entire examination in less than five minutes.
b. Defense Approach to ChallengingAdequacy
In contrast, defense counsel universally subscribe to the
Wright's Federal Practiceand Procedure and Moore's Federal Practice
understanding of the adequacy inquiry. In this view, it is both
necessary and legitimate for defense counsel and the court to
extensively probe into the class representative's knowledge and
in
active
participation
of
the
litigation,
understanding
decisionmaking, ability and willingness to financially support the
litigation, moral character to serve as a fiduciary, actions regarding
solicitation to serve as the class representative, and numerous other
issues that bear on the ultimate issue whether the class
92
representative has ceded control of the litigation to the attorneys.
To establish a record concerning the adequacy of the class
all class
defense counsel routinely depose
representative,
93
representatives prior to the motion for class certification.
Information elicited during this deposition may serve as the basis for
challenging the class representative's adequacy in the defendant's
brief in opposition to class certification. The class representative's
92. Although most defense attorneys will attempt to make a factual record bearing on the
inadequacy of the proposed class representatives, Professors Macey and Miller have argued that
defendant's conduct depends on how the defendant's interests are aligned, and that in some
cases, the defendant may have little or no incentive to challenge the adequacy and typicality of
the class representatives. Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 63-66.
93. To the extent that plaintiffs counsel invoke attorney-client privilege (and instruct the
class representative not to answer questions), taking the class representative's deposition
frequently may prove to be a frustrating exercise for defense counsel. Such invocations of
attorney-client privilege in this context are usually inappropriate and improper invocations of
the privilege. Defense counsel have the right to make inquiries of the class representative that
have bearing on the adequacy issue, and no privilege shields the class representative from
answering these questions.
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testimony also serves as a basis for impeachment if, during the course
of live certification testimony, class counsel attempt to rehabilitate the
class representative's prior deposition testimony.
Defense counsel have a second opportunity to explore adequacy
issues during cross-examination at the certification hearing. Defense
attorneys use this opportunity both to create a record of inadequacy
based on the array of criteria that affect the adequacy determination,
as well as to impeach the class representative who has changed prior
adverse deposition testimony.
c. JudicialApproach to Assessing the Class Representative's
Adequacy
Most courts seemingly subscribe to the Newberg potted-plant
view of the class representative. As a consequence, this tends to
induce judicial inattention, if not an outright disregard of the
evidentiary presentation regarding the adequacy of the class
representative. Quite similar to the judicial approach to assessing the
adequacy of proposed class counsel, most judges presumptively give
the proposed class representatives a free pass. There is virtually no
effort to establish actual conformity to the array of possible concerns
relating to the adequacy inquiry.
Although most judges will sit patiently through a lengthy
cross-examination of a class representative, some do not.94 Some
judges may truncate cross-examination of the class representatives
altogether. Furthermore, judges rarely ask any questions of the
proposed class representatives on their own initiative. These
problems, of course, are exacerbated in jurisdictions where class
counsel attempt to prove adequacy of the proposed class
representatives on a paper submission without a live evidentiary
hearing. More often than not, such submissions consist of mere
conclusory recitations and self-serving statements, often copied from
the pleadings, that the class representatives are adequate, will
vigorously represent the class because they have retained competent
counsel, and are free of conflicts of interest.

94. I have been present at more than one class certification hearing where the judge,
impatient with defense cross-examination of the class representative, has ordered counsel to
cease and desist from any further examination, explaining that nothing the witness could say
would cause the court not to find to find the class representative adequate. In other instances
judges have stated that such examination is pointless because the adequacy requirement for the
class representative is so low. This abrupt termination of cross-examination of the class
representative frustrates the ability of defense counsel to make its record concerning the
adequacy of the class representative.
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3. Possible Explanations for the Inadequate Assessment of the
Adequacy of Class Representatives
In canvassing possible reasons for why courts do not take the
adequacy of class representatives seriously, the following possible
rationales closely parallel the universe of explanations regarding the
inquiry surrounding the adequacy of class counsel.
First, whether courts are willing to engage in a probing inquiry
of the adequacy of the class representative depends on what approach
the court believes is appropriate. Because most courts historically and
reflexively believe that the most important thing is the presence of
competent counsel (the Newberg view), there is a general feeling of
apathy toward class representative issues. In short, courts seem
perfectly willing to ignore even the most clueless class representatives.
One must also consider the enduring legacy of Mrs. Surowitz.
In Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, the Supreme Court in 1966
famously held that an illiterate, elderly Polish immigrant who signed
a verified class action complaint in a shareholder derivative lawsuit
had not violated the verification requirement in Rule 23(b). 95 Faced
with a colorful set of facts, the Supreme Court decided Mrs. Surowitz
had not violated the verification requirement because she had been
counseled and assisted by her aptly named son-in-law, Mr. Brilliant,
who, according to the reported decision, "had graduated from
Columbia University, possessed a master's degree in economics from
Columbia University, was a professional investment advisor, and in
addition to his degrees and his financial acumen, he wore a Phi Beta
Kappa key." 96 The influence of the Surowitz decision on the Rule
23(a)(4) adequacy inquiry has been pervasive, 97 notwithstanding the
95. 383 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1966).
96. Id. at 368, 371-72. Many courts that cite Surowitz for the proposition of a minimalist
standard for adequacy for class representatives frequently recite the facts relating to Mrs.
Surowitz's illiteracy, her lack of formal education, her son-in-law Mr. Brilliant, and his Phi Beta
Kappa key. Some courts also point to Mrs. Surowitz's Polish ethnicity. See reported cases cited
infra note 97.
97. See, e.g., In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetier, A.S. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 353, 356-57
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Surowitz as support for using a low threshold for adequacy
determinations); In re Ins. Mgmt. Solutions Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 514, 517 (M.D.
Fla. 2002) (same); In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 687, 696-97 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(holding that Supreme Court's rationale in Surowitz "is clearly applicable to Rule 23(a)(4).");
Paper Sys. Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 193 F.R.D. 601, 609 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (citing other cases to
the same effect); McFarland v. Bass & Associates, P.C., No. 97 C 3944, 1998 WL 42286, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1998) (citing Surowitz as authority for the proposition that "[t]he knowledge
requirement for the named representative is minimal."); Wells v. HBO & Co., Civ. A. No.
1:87CV657JTC, 1991 WL 131177, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 1991) (same); Clark v. TAP Pharm.
Prods., Inc., 798 N.E. 2d 123, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (same); In re Fuqua Industries, Inc.
Shareholder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 131-133 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing Surowitz). Impressively,
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fact that the Supreme Court decided the case in the context of a
shareholder derivative lawsuit, under a pre-amended version of the
modern class action rule, and based on a ground entirely apart from
98
the Rule 23(a) adequacy issue.
Nonetheless, the ghost of Mrs. Surowitz haunts the modern
assessment of the class representative, perhaps because everyone,
including judges, remembers learning about the colorful Mrs.
Surowitz in law school. Mrs. Surowitz has become the rallying cry for
the lowest possible denominator for assessing the adequacy of the
class representative, an argument which runs something like: "If the
Supreme Court held that an illiterate Polish immigrant with limited
English vocabulary and practically no formal education is an adequate

Mrs. Surowitz's impact has stretched even all the way to the Northern Mariana Islands. Does I
v. Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2002 WL 1000073, at * 4 (D. N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002).
98. Surowitz, 383 U.S. 363, 373 (holding that the court could not "construe Rule 23 or any
other one of the Federal Rules as compelling courts to summarily dismiss, without any answer or
argument at all, cases like this where grave charges of fraud are shown by the record to be based
on reasonable beliefs growing out of careful investigation."). For a scathing critique of the almost
universal misapplication of the Surowitz case, see Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d
475, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions,
104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2127 n.254 (1995)):
As an initial matter, we articulate the adequacy standard outside of any specific
statutory context. The district court cited Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
363, (1966), for the notion that "[a]dequacy is a low threshold." This is a
misapplication of Surowitz.
Although "often cited inaccurately to support arguments that plaintiffs with little
understanding of the facts or theories of their claims and little incentive to monitor
the litigation can nonetheless be adequate class representatives," Surowitz did not
address the adequacy requirement, but concerned only the verification of a complaint.
Just as Surowitz did not hold, this circuit has never read Surowitz so broadly as to
support the proposition that a class representative who does not understand any of
the legal relationships or comprehend any of the business transactions described in
the complaint nonetheless may be "adequate" for purposes of class certification.
To the contrary, we have described "[t]he adequacy requirement [as one that] mandates
an inquiry into ... the willingness and ability of the representatives to take an active role in and
control the litigation and to protect the interests of absentees." Likewise, even in Gonzales v.
Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), which interpreted rule 23(a)'s adequacy requirement
somewhat more loosely, we insisted that "it must appear that the representative[s] will
vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel." Both understandings even accepting the variance between them - require the class representatives to possess a
sufficient level of knowledge and understanding to be capable of "controlling" or "prosecuting"
the litigation. (citation omitted)
See also Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 484 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
"[t]he adequacy requirement mandates an inquiry into ... the willingness and ability of the
representative to take an active role in and control the litigation and to protect the interests of
").
absentees ....
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representative, then my equally clueless class representative is
adequate as well." 99
Second, although professional courtesy is not a likely reason
explaining courts' lack of vigorous inquiry into a class representative's
adequacy, it is likely that many judges feel a similar distaste for
grilling a proposed class representative. The types of questions
relating to adequacy issues invade many people's "comfort zones,"
including judges, and if a judge is predisposed to believe that the class
representative's adequacy does not matter that much, then the judge
is perhaps likely to become impatient with the probing of a hapless
class representative.
Third, the cursory, presumptive, rubber stamping of the
adequacy of class representatives is similarly the result of plaintiffdrafted class certification orders. As indicated above, plaintiff-drafted
certification orders will recite, in rote conclusory fashion, that the
court finds the class representatives adequate to represent the class
and free of conflicts of interest. Again, this is typically set forth
without any findings of fact. Although defense counsel may be invited
to submit a defense version of the certification order, by the time the
court has informed the parties it intends to certify the class, the
adequacy of the class representatives has been rendered virtually
moot, and defense counsel are unlikely to counter with an order
setting forth all the reasons why the class representatives are
inadequate, even if the defense believes there are issues surrounding
adequacy.
4.

Consequences of the Class Representative Adequacy Free Pass

Similar to the way in which courts deal with the adequacy of
class counsel, so too do judges deal with the class representatives.
Because most courts apply a virtual presumption of class
representative adequacy, defense counsel often have an extremely
difficult task in raising the issue and persuading courts that problems
with designated class representatives actually matter. Instead, courts
mostly are inclined to routinely rubber stamp approval of proposed
class representatives.
The consequences of judges failing to initiate a probing inquiry
regarding class representatives' adequacy are similar to the problems
relating to the class counsel determination. Hence, courts tend to
discount the class representatives' fiduciary duties in protecting the
99. Mrs. Surowitz is the frequently cited standard by class counsel for evaluating the
adequacy of the class representative. For cases invoking Surowitz on similar sets of facts, see
supra note 104.
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interests of absent class members.
Courts discount the class
representatives' role in identifying or averting serious representation
problems that may unfold during subsequent class proceedings. These
problems range from lack of diligence in prosecuting the action;
ineffective assistance of counsel as a consequence of inexperience,
underfinancing, or other reasons; abandonment of parties or claims;
attorney self-dealing; and collusion or other ethical improprieties; to,
most importantly, the conduct and conclusion of settlement
negotiations.
III. PROBLEMS OF THE ADEQUACY DETERMINATION IN SETTLEMENT
CLASSES

As indicated above, the Supreme Court in Amchem resolved the
great debate over settlement classes that developed during the mid1990s. 10 0 In Amchem, the Supreme Court approved the concept of the
settlement class and indicated that settlement classes were required
to satisfy all the requirements for certification as litigation classes,
except for the manageability requirement.1 0 1
As an indirect
consequence of the Court's Amchem decision, the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules abandoned its proposal to amend Rule 23(b) to
explicitly provide for a new category embracing the settlement class. 10 2
Pure settlement classes, then, require satisfaction of the same
Rule 23(a) threshold requirements, including adequacy. The adequacy
inquiry in settlement classes, however, raises additional problems
apart from those present in litigation classes. Hence, the adequacy
determination in the settlement class context is even more fraught
with opportunities for subsequent collateral attack.
A. The Concept of the Settlement Class After Amchem
Settlement classes existed and were court-approved prior to the
great debate inspired by the Georgine-Amchem litigation. In the preAmchem era, courts would conditionally or provisionally certify a
class, and if during the course of proceedings it appeared that the
parties were amenable to settlement, the court would certify a class
for settlement purposes. Final certification of the previously certified
class would occur at the time of the settlement approval.
100. See supra Part II.
101. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
102. However, the Advisory Committee did return to issues relating to class settlement by
amending and expanding Rule 23(e) as part of the 2003 rule revision package. See FED. R. CIv. P.
23(e) advisory committee's note.
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The Amchem litigation presented a somewhat stark variation
on previously accepted practice because Amchem presented the
"settlement-only" class. 10 3 As a consequence, the Court made the
additional point that when judges are confronted with settlement-only
classes, the other specifications of the rule (apart from the
manageability factor) "demand undiluted, or even heightened,
attention in the settlement context."' 1 4 The Court indicated that
"[s]uch attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a
settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is
litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they
10
unfold." 5
As the objectors in the Amchem case forcefully argued, the pure
settlement-only class raises the specter of an entire array of possible
abusive class litigation practices, precisely because the proposed class
and counsel previously would not have been subject to judicial
scrutiny. With exceptional relevance here, the settlement-only class is
created in the absence of any prior judicial oversight or determination
of the adequacy of class representation; the adequacy determination
comes at the back end of the litigation, not the front end (as is typical
for litigation classes). As I argue below, back end determinations of
adequacy are highly problematic for a variety of reasons, and they
further serve to render settlement classes especially vulnerable to
collateral attack.
B. Adequacy Issues in Settlement Classes After Amchem and Ortiz
Although the Court's central discussion in Amchem addressed
the issue of recognizing settlement classes and promulgating
standards governing them, the Court also concluded on the merits
that the class certification was improper because of a lack of adequate
representation. 10 6 In so doing, the Court seemingly endorsed the
Newberg approach to the adequacy requirement, indicating that the
Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy inquiry "serves to uncover conflicts of interest
10 7
between named parties and the class they seek to represent."

103. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 592 (noting that the District Court approved the class for
settlement only).
104. Id. at 620.
105. Id.; see also id. at 620 n. 16 (noting that "proposed settlement classes sometimes warrant
more, not less, caution on the question of certification.").
106. Id. at 625-27. The Court affirmed the Third Circuit's reversal of the trial court's class
certification order.
107. Id. at 625 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-158 n.13
(1982)).
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On the facts, the Court concluded that the interests of the class
members with diverse medical conditions were not and could not be
aligned within a single class.10 8 The Court further concluded that a
conflict of interest existed between currently injured claimants and
exposure-only or "future" claimants. 10 9 The Court concluded that the
class representatives had failed to adequately represent the class
because although the named parties alleged a range of complaints,
each served as a representative of the entire class and not a
representative for separate constituencies. 110
The chief lesson drawn from the Amchem analysis of the
adequacy problem is the Court's suggestion that when faced with a
disparate class, the settling parties need to provide "structural
assurances of fair and adequate representation,"' '
both in the
settlement terms and the structure of the negotiations. 112 Having set
forth this broad proposition, the Court provided no examples, in either
the negotiations or the settlement terms, as to what might constitute
"structural assurances" of adequate representation. 113 In addition, the
Amchem Court determined the adequacy issue solely with reference to
the class representatives; the Court never addressed the issue of the
11 4
adequacy of class counsel.
Later, the Court revisited the adequacy issue in the context of
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) global asbestos settlement classes in Ortiz.
Confronted with another diverse-injury asbestos settlement, the Court
in Ortiz substantially reiterated its Amchem analysis and reached the
same conclusion-namely, that the settlement was defective because
of a lack of adequate representation. 11 5 The Court's adequacy
analysis, though, added two new elements. First, the Court indicated
that the "structural assurances" suggested in Amchem included
provisions such as subclassing and separate counsel for those
108. Id. at 627.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. There is some suggestion that subelassing might satisfy the "structural assurances,"
principle; the Court cites with approval the Second Circuit decision describing the use of
subclasses to deal with differences among asbestos claimants. Id. (citing In re Joint E. and S.
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742-43 (1992), modified on reh'g sub nom. In re Findley, 993
F.2d 7 (1993)).
114. Id. at 626 n.20 ("[We decline to address adequacy-of-counsel issues discretely in light of
our conclusions that common questions of law or fact do not predominate and that the named
plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the interests of this enormous class."). Throughout the
lengthy Georgine-Amchem litigation, the objectors to the Amchem settlement had strenuously
contended that class counsel were inadequate for a variety of reasons.
115. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp, 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999).
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subclasses. 116 Second, the Court indicated its distaste for the fact that
the class representatives were not named until after the agreement in
principle had been negotiated by counsel. 117 Third, similar to its
Amchem decision, the Court averred to the principle that adequacy of
representation also embraced the competency and conflicts of class
18
counsel without analyzing or deciding that issue.
Perhaps the Court's most important acknowledgment relating
to the adequacy issue was the Court's recognition, in both Amchem
and Ortiz, that the fairness of a settlement agreement cannot itself
bootstrap a finding of adequacy (or satisfaction of the other class
certification requirements).1 1 9
Thus, the Court recognized that
adequate representation must be in place during all phases of class
proceedings; back end ratification of adequacy may not be sufficient to
comply with Rule 23:
Here, just as in the earlier case, the proponents of the settlement are trying to rewrite
Rule 23; each ignores the fact that Rule 23 requires protections under subdivisions (a)
and (b) against inequity and potential inequity at the precertification stage, quite
independently of the required determination at postcertification120fairness review under
subdivision (e) that any settlement is fair in an overriding sense.

C. The Problems of Back end Adequacy Determinationsin Settlement
Classes
The Court's Amchem and Ortiz decisions, then, provide
barebones guidance concerning the adequacy requirement for
settlement classes.
In essence, the Court approximated the
Newbergian approach to thinking about adequacy: the standard for
adequate class counsel consists of two elements, competency and
conflicts, and the standard for adequate class representatives consists
of one inquiry, conflicts of interest.
In the relatively sparse analysis devoted to the adequacy issue,
the Court basically informed us of the following: (1) in certifying a
settlement class, courts must find adequacy of representation; (2)
disabling conflicts of interest between the class representatives and
class members will defeat class certification; (3) class representatives
should be named before the deal is done; (4) class counsel may be
found to be inadequate if counsel is not competent and has conflicts of
interest; and (5) adequate representation needs to be in place
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 856 n.31.
Id.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at, 622; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858.
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throughout the proceedings, including in the precertification stages of
121
the litigation.
I have argued above that parties and courts tend not to take
the adequacy inquiry seriously during the process for certification of
litigation classes or during upfront certification. 122 It seems to me
that the adequacy requirement is taken even less seriously when
certification occurs at the back end of class litigation, especially in the
context of settlement-only classes. There are a variety of reasons for
this phenomenon.
There are at least two ways in which a settlement class may
evolve. In the first instance, a court may certify a conditional class as
the precursor to the settlement class. 123 In this scenario, the court
may (or may not) have made a prior finding of adequacy of class
counsel and the class representatives. If a hearing on conditional
certification occurs, one may also assume that the adequacy inquiry is
conducted with the same lack of rigor described in the preceding
discussion. Moreover, because conditional certification is inherently
tentative, the court has no overwhelming incentive to definitively
probe adequacy issues.
When a settlement results from conditional certification and
the parties move for settlement approval pursuant to Rule 23, the
court's prior conclusory findings of adequacy are likely to be
bootstrapped onto the court's approval of the settlement without
adequate further inquiry.
Hence, earlier deficiencies in proving
adequacy are likely to be carried over into the settlement approval
process without further probing of the adequacy requirement. In
addition, neither the parties nor the court has an special interest in
extensively probing adequacy in the settlement context, even in the
shadow of a potential collateral attack.
In second scenario-the Amchem-style, settlement-only
context-the adequacy determination is even more likely to be tepid,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's admonitions in both Amchem
and Ortiz.125
This is because without a front end adequacy
determination, none of the parties at the back end have any
compelling interest in challenging adequacy. Instead, the parties are
aligned in interest in obtaining the court's approval of the settlement.
Whereas in front end certifications of litigation classes, defense

121.
122.
123.
125.

See id., 527 U.S. at 857-61.
See supra Part II..
See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 605.
Id. at 622; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858.
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counsel are likely to mount an attack against adequacy and the court.
at least, is more likely to have some disputed record on this issue, in
the settlement-only context defense counsel have no such interest in
challenging adequacy.
Compounding this problem is the court's independent interest
in settling cases on its docket. Although the court independently is a
nominal protector of the class, if the parties come to the court with an
agreed settlement, most courts are unlikely to engage in an
independent rigorous examination of the structure, content, and
provisions of a settlement, let alone the adequacy of the
representation in accomplishing that settlement.
In settlement classes, then, objectors (or intervenors) provide
the only possible effective guarantee of the adequacy requirement. If
no objectors appear to challenge a class settlement, the settlement will
be approved on a conclusory record and finding of adequacy. If
objectors do appear, however, the barriers to their ability to mount a
challenge to adequacy are formidable. Most courts limit the ability of
objectors to take discovery, especially relating to such issues at the
conduct of prior settlement negotiations. Even influential publications
such as the Manual for Complex Litigation, approve such discovery
limitations on objectors. 127 Because of these limitations, and because
many objectors may not have been involved in the litigation prior to
settlement, it is extraordinarily difficult for objectors to reconstruct
adequacy after-the-fact.
The net result is that in all the different class action scenarios
-upfront
certification, conditional certification, and back end
certification-the litigants and the courts are not likely to engage in a
robust determination of the adequacy requirement. This sets the
stage for even more complicated issues in the event of a subsequent
collateral attack, because a remote forum has to contemplate
adequacy issues on a largely conclusory record. And, as the Agent
Orange litigation demonstrates, collateral attacks that occur years
after the fact compound the problem of reconstructing adequacy.

127. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.643 (2004) (citing cases).
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IV. ADEQUACY ISSUES IN SETTLEMENT CLASSES: THE AGENT ORANGE
CASE

128

The array of issues and problems relating to determining
adequacy in class action litigation are amply illustrated by the Agent
Orange settlement class and the collateral attack that the settlement
spawned nearly twenty years after Judge Jack Weinstein gave his
final approval in 1984.129 The Agent Orange litigation and settlement
class is so interesting precisely because the courts-both trial courts
and the Second Circuit-purported to make adequacy determinations
at several junctures during the course of that litigation, but those
determinations did not insulate the Agent Orange settlement from
subsequent attack.
The defenders of the Agent Orange settlement contended that
the settlement was entitled to finality and that the courts had ensured
adequacy of representation at many times during the development of
litigation. I would suggest, however, that apart from an egregious
Amchem-style conflict of interest, the Agent Orange collateral attack
illustrates how difficult it is to determine the adequacy question after
the fact, after many years, and on a largely conclusory record.
At every crucial juncture during the Agent Orange litigation
when the courts should have been vigorously scrutinizing adequacy,
the courts failed to do so in a meaningful way. In fairness to Judges
Pratt and Weinstein, the courts' adequacy determinations reflect the
judicial culture of the early 1980s, when adequacy issues were given
even less attention than today. Nonetheless, these failures on the part
of the litigants and the judiciary came back to haunt all the
participants years after the fact. Furthermore, these failures led to
participants in the collateral attack having the near impossible task of
attempting to review the litigation through nothing but narrative
reconstruction, faulty memory, and evidentiary gaps.
In a sense, the Agent Orange litigation embodied almost every
variation on the problematic and inadequate assessments of adequacy
in both litigation and settlement classes. The Agent Orange litigation,
it seems, amply demonstrates the problems that courts have with
front end adequacy determinations, conditional certification, and back

128. Portions of this discussion and analysis are adapted from Linda S. Mullenix, Apocalypse
Forever: Revisiting the Adequacy of the Agent Orange Settlement, Twenty-Five Years Later, 5
PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 274 (2003). For a discussion of the underlying Stephenson litigation,

see Nagareda, supranote 6, at 316-333.
129. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
132. Mullenix, supra note 128, at 274.
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end adequacy determinations at settlement class approval.
In
addition, the Agent Orange litigation illustrates the cumulative nature
of problems relating to inadequate assessments of adequacy when
these issues arise in the context of subsequent collateral attacks and
courts are forced to reconstruct prior adequacy determinations.
A. The Issues Before the Supreme Court in the Agent Orange Appeal
By the time the challenge to the Agent Orange settlement was
appealed to the Supreme Court during the 2002-03 Term, the
settlement class issues had crystallized into broad but important
questions relating to the sanctity of settlement classes. Essentially
but simply, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of
whether absent class members are precluded from collaterally
attacking the adequacy of representation in a class action settlement,
especially where both the trial court and appellate courts had
132
determined adequacy on numerous prior occasions.
In addition, the Court was confronted with the question of
whether, if such a collateral attack was permissible, "adequacy of
representation" was properly determined by standards prevailing at
the time of the original judicial assessment or if those standards might
be re-evaluated through the lens of subsequently developed law
relating to adequacy concepts. This latter question was especially
significant because the Agent Orange settlement class was certified
during an earlier pre-Amchem, pre-Ortiz era. Thus Judges Pratt,
Weinstein, and the Second Circuit were acting during the early 1980s
without the benefit of the Supreme Court's late-1990s wisdom on
adequacy issues. Arguably, the Agent Orange settlement class was
approved during the heyday of a judicially lax approach to adequacy
issues.
Thus, the Agent Orange appeal raised the question of whether
it was permissible, on subsequent collateral attack, for another court
to "Monday-morning quarterback" the standards that were applied, or
should have been applied, to a court's earlier adequacy
determinations. In other words, the Court asked this question: If
adequacy standards and expectations are moving targets through
time, can a subsequent court find adequacy error in hindsight?
B. The UnderlyingFactualand ProceduralHistory of the Agent
Orange Class
The factual and procedural history of the Agent Orange
litigation is worth some explanation, as this narrative history serves
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to illustrate the number of times the judiciary reviewed and approved
the adequacy requirement for class certification.
The Dow Chemical and Monsanto Chemical Companies, as well
as other defendants in the original Agent Orange litigation, pursued
the Agent Orange appeal to the Supreme Court in order to preserve
their class action settlement of Agent Orange claims negotiated,
approved, implemented in the mid-1980s, and implemented in the
ensuing decade. 133 The Agent Orange appeal to the Supreme Court
during the 2002-03 Term was compelling on several fronts. First, the
litigation involved the ongoing, highly emotional claims of Vietnam
veterans, many of whom are now in their fifties. 134 In addition, it was
not without great irony that Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District
of New York had sought to salve the wounds of the Vietnam War with
his approval and supervision of the Agent Orange class action
135
litigation and the resulting settlement class.
The Agent Orange appeal before the Supreme Court began with
two separate lawsuits brought by Daniel Stephenson, a Louisiana
resident and a civilian pilot, and Joe Issacson, a New Jersey resident
and school vice-principal. 1 36 Stephenson was a helicopter pilot in
Vietnam who was exposed to Agent Orange in-country. 137 In 1998,
138
Stephenson was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a deadly cancer.
Issacson served as an Air Force crewman at an airfield that supported
Agent Orange missions. 139 In 1996, Issacson was diagnosed with non0
Hodgkin's lymphoma, also a deadly cancer.14
Stephenson filed a lawsuit in Louisiana federal court in 1998,
and Issacson filed a lawsuit in New Jersey state court in 1999 against
the corporations that had manufactured the herbicide Agent
Orange.1 4 ' Issacson's case was subsequently removed to New Jersey
federal court.' 42 Each alleged that he had become ill due to exposure
to Agent Orange while in Vietnam. 143 Under Louisiana and New
Jersey law, neither Stephenson nor Issacson could bring a claim

133.
134.
135.
136.

Mullenix, supra note 128, at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275.

137. Id.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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against the Agent Orange manufacturers until each was actually
144
diagnosed with cancer.
Stephenson and Issacson contended that they had not been
adequately represented in the 1985 Agent Orange class action
settlement because their illnesses did not manifest until after 1994,
the cut-off date for direct cash payments to veterans under the
settlement. 145 Consequently, if the Agent Orange settlement was
construed to apply as a complete bar to recovery, Stephenson and
46
Issacson would be incapable of recovering for their deadly diseases.'
The Stephenson and Issacson cases were transferred to the
Eastern District of New York, which had continuing supervisory
jurisdiction over the Agent Orange settlement. 47 On December 13,
1999, Judge Weinstein dismissed the two cases based on the
conclusion that the court's approval of the Agent Orange settlement
was final. 48 Judge Weinstein additionally noted that "you have to
attack directly, not by collateral attack some fifteen years after
judgment."' 49 Stephenson and Issacson appealed the dismissal of
their claims. 150 The Second Circuit unanimously held that Stephenson
and Issacson were not precluded from litigating the issue of adequate
representation and that they could bring a collateral attack on prior
holdings that the class representation had been adequate.' 5 ' The
court noted that Stephenson and Issacson fell within the settlement
class definition and that prior Agent Orange trial and appellate
decisions had considered and rejected challenges to the settlement
1 52
based on the adequacy of class representation.
The court further held, however, that none of the earlier
decisions had addressed the adequacy of representation for class
members whose injuries manifested after 1994 (such as Stephenson
and Issacson). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Hansberry
v. Lee,' 53 the Second Circuit concluded that if Stephenson and Issacson
were not proper parties to the class action judgment, then res judicata
154
could not operate to defeat their claims.

144. Id.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Judge Weinstein's orders are not reported.
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 261.
Id. at 260-61.
311 U.S. 32 (1940).
Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257-58.
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Moreover, the Second Circuit concluded that these cases
required the court "to determine the effect of the Supreme Court's
landmark class action decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,155 and Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.,156 on a previously settled
class action."'157 The Second Circuit also noted that due process
requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, and that Stephenson
and Issacson had received neither. 158
Thus, in the absence of
adequate class representation, the class action settlement could not
preclude their current claims.
The Second Circuit's decision was rendered against a backdrop
of more than twenty-five years of Agent Orange litigation, which
constitutes a well-documented, lengthy, and tortuous excursion
through the American judicial system.' 9 With the end of the Vietnam
War in 1975 and the return of all remaining armed forces, the original
Agent Orange lawsuits were filed in the late 1970s. 160 The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation created an Agent Orange MDL in
1979, and the individual Agent Orange lawsuits were consolidated in
the Eastern District of New York under the supervision of Judge
16
Pratt. 1
In 1980, Judge Pratt conditionally certified a class consisting of
"all persons exposed to Agent Orange and various members of their
families."'16 2
In conditionally certifying the class, Judge Pratt
considered the requirements of Rule 23(a), which include adequacy of
representation. 1 63 He found this and the other elements of Rule 23(a)
satisfied. 64 However, Judge Pratt never entered an order certifying
the class. Judge Pratt's entire recitation of the standard governing
adequacy was as follows: "[a]dequacy of representation depends on the
qualifications and interests of counsel for the class representatives,
the absence of antagonism or conflicting interests, and a sharing of
interests between class representatives and absentees.' 6 5

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

521 U.S. 591 (1997).
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 251.
Id. at 260-61.
Mullenix, supra note 128, at 275.
Id.

161. Id.

162.
163.
164.
165.

In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 788.
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 788.
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The court's discussion of adequacy comprised one short
paragraph.166 Significantly, at the time of class certification and the
finding of adequacy, the class had no named class representatives.
Seemingly untroubled by the absence of actual class representatives,
Judge Pratt noted:
[Hiere, the court will select from among the hundreds of plaintiffs representative
persons who have a substantial stake in the litigation, who lack conflicts, antagonisms
or reasons to be motivated by factors inconsistent with the motives of absentee
class
167
members, and who will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Concluding its analysis of the adequacy requirement, the court
stated that the class would be represented by "experienced, capable
counsel, Yannacone and Associates, who have shown themselves
willing to undertake the considerable commitment of time, energy and
money necessary for the vigorous prosecution of the claims here
asserted.' 1 68
In hindsight, Judge Pratt's conclusory findings
concerning the adequacy of Yannacone & Associates would prove
ironic; Yannacone & Associates withdrew as class counsel in
September 1983 because of management problems and a lack of

financing. 169
In 1983, Judge Jack Weinstein assumed responsibility over the
Agent Orange litigation after Judge Pratt was appointed to the Second
Circuit.170 Judge Weinstein revisited the class certification
determination and entered a formal order certifying a Rule 23(b)(3)
class. In so doing, Judge Weinstein noted that the four prerequisites
to class certification, including the adequacy requirement, had been
171
analyzed carefully by the court and found to exist.
Judge Weinstein defined the class to include the following:
Those persons who were in the United States, New Zealand, or Australian Armed
Forces at any time from 1961 to 1972 who were injured while in or near Vietnam by
exposure to Agent Orange or other phenoxy herbicides .... The class also includes
spouses, parents, and children or the veterans born before January 1, 1984, directly or
17 2
derivatively injured as a result of the exposure.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 611 F. Supp. 1452,
1454 (E.D.N.Y.1985).
170. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 729.
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Stephenson and Issacson contended that this original class
definition did not include veterans, such as themselves, who had not
173
yet manifested any disease.
Judge Weinstein ordered that notice be given of the action,
including the right to opt-out of the lawsuit until May 1, 1984, and he
approved serving that notice directly, by publication, and by other
means. He scheduled trial of the class action for May 7, 1984.174
Stephenson and Issacson contend that they never received notice of
the pending class action or of their right to opt-out. 175 Consequently,
they did not opt-out of the class.
In the ensuing weeks, the parties conducted settlement
negotiations assisted by three special masters. The parties reached a
settlement on the morning of May 7, 1984.176 The settlement provided
that the defendants would pay a lump sum of $180 million into a fund
for the benefit of the class, but the settlement did not provide a
formula for distribution of the fund to class claimants.' 77 The
settlement specified that "all members of the Class are forever barred
from instituting or maintaining any action against any of the
defendants ... arising out of or relating to, or in the future arising out
of or relating to, the subject matter of the Complaint."'178
The
settlement also indicated that "the class specifically includes persons
79
who have not yet manifested injury."'
Judge Weinstein conducted eleven days of hearings throughout
the United States to receive comments relating to the proposed
settlement.180 He ordered plaintiffs' counsel to mail notice of the
proposed settlement and fairness hearings to all known members of
the class, as well as to provide notice by publication.' 8 ' Again,
Stephenson and Issacson contended that they did not receive any
notice of the settlement class, the settlement terms, or the class
definition.' 8 2 During extensive fairness hearings, Judge Weinstein
heard from almost five hundred witnesses, many of whom expressed
concern about provision for Vietnam veterans who had not yet

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Mullenix, supra note 128,
In re "Agent Orange," 100
Mullenix, supra note 128,
Id.
Id.
In re "Agent Orange," 597
Id. at 865.
Mullenix, supra note 128,
Id.
Id.

at 275.
F.R.D. at 732.
at 276.

F. Supp. 740, 864-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
at 276.
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manifested injury.1 8 3 Some of these witnesses recommended that a
18 4
subclass be created for such objectors.
Judge Weinstein denied this request for a subclass of claimants
who had not yet manifested injury. He concluded that the objectors'
views had been taken into account and that "no purpose would have
been served by appointing counsel for a subclass of disappointed
claimants except to increase expenses to the class and delay
proceedings."' 1 5 At the conclusion of the fairness hearings, Judge
18 6
Weinstein preliminarily approved the settlement under Rule 23(e).
Judge Weinstein entered a final order approving the settlement on

January 7,

1985.187

Objecting class members then moved for reconsideration,
contending in part that the class action representatives may have
been inadequate in that no class representatives represented class
members who were deceased or who had not yet manifested injury.
The objectors also contended that there was an intraclass conflict
between the living, presently injured claimants and the deceased and
not-yet-manifested-injury claimants (called "future claimants").,18
Judge Weinstein denied the motion for reconsideration without

opinion. 189
After approval of the settlement, Judge Weinstein and special
master Kenneth Feinberg supervised the implementation and
distribution of the settlement funds. The distribution plan provided
that 75 percent of the $180 million settlement fund would be
distributed directly to survivors of deceased veterans and to veterans
who became totally disabled due to illness before January 1, 1995.190
The remainder of the fund was set aside to support a "class assistance
foundation" run by veterans to help class members deal with their
medical and other problems. 19 1 By 1997, all Agent Orange settlement
funds had been disbursed.
The district court entered a judgment dismissing all the claims
of every plaintiff constituting the Rule 23(b)(3) class on the merits and

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. In re "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. 740, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
186. Id. at 746-858. This was pursuant to Rule 23(e) as it existed in 1984-85. Id.
187. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd in
relevant part, 818 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1987).
188. Mullenix, supranote 128, at 276.
189. Id.
190. In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1410-12.
191. Id. at 1432.
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with prejudice.' 92 The order provided that class members were
"forever barred from instituting or maintaining any action against any
193
of the defendants" relating to the subject matter of the complaints.
Objecting class members brought a direct appeal from final
approval of the Agent Orange class settlement. 194 The objectors again
contended that the class should not have been certified because class
representation was inadequate. 195 The objectors argued that the
injured class representatives had failed to protect the interests of
veterans who would manifest injury after 1995, when the settlement
fund would be depleted. 19 6 The Second Circuit considered this and
197
other contentions and upheld the settlement.
In 1989 and 1990, individual veterans brought two new class
actions against the Agent Orange manufacturers alleging that they
had suffered injuries caused by Agent Orange that did not manifest or
were not discovered until after May 7, 1984, the Agent Orange
settlement date. 198 Judge Weinstein dismissed these cases, holding
that the claims were precluded by the Agent Orange settlement. 199 The
Second Circuit affirmed Judge Weinstein's dismissal, concluding that
class members who became ill after the settlement was reached were
barred from pursuing individual claims against the Agent Orange
200
manufacturers.
The rejection of these claims and the preclusive effect of the
Agent Orange settlement set the stage for a revisitation of the same
panoply of issues in the Stephenson and Issacson cases. Five years
after two Vietnam veterans were precluded from pursuing their
claims, Stephenson and Issacson came forward once again to challenge
the fairness and legitimacy of a class action settlement that was
20
negotiated and finalized years ago. '

192. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 618 F. Supp. 623, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
193. Id.
194. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1004 (1988).

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 167.
198. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp 902, 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
199. Id. at 918-919.
200. Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996
F.2d 1425, 1439 (2d Cir. 1993).
201. Mullenix, supra note 128, at 276.
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C. Analysis of the CollateralAttack Problem in the Agent Orange
Appeal
The Supreme Court appeal in the continuing Agent Orange
litigation raised fundamental questions about the res judicata effects
of class action judgments measured against the due process rights of
absent class members.
The Court was to have considered two
different categories of due process claims: one set of due process claims
by the Agent Orange manufacturers and a completely different set by
the objecting Vietnam veterans. The Court had the opportunity to
weigh the competing interests of the preclusion theory against the due
process rights of absent class members to a fair adjudication of their
rights.
The petitioners, the Agent Orange manufacturers, essentially
asked the Supreme Court to uphold the sanctity of a bargain they and
the plaintiffs had negotiated more than fifteen years earlier. 20 2 The
Agent Orange manufacturers argued that the parties aggressively and
fairly negotiated the settlement and that it had been subjected to
judicial
scrutiny
several
times
over. 20 3 Furthermore,
the
manufacturers argued that the parties and objectors challenged the
adequacy of the class representation several times, and in every
instance the trial and appellate courts considered these arguments but
20 4
nonetheless had approved and upheld the settlement.
The manufacturers argued that, in light of this careful history,
the Supreme Court should uphold the fundamental principle that
there must be an end to litigation. 2°5 Therefore, the manufacturers
claimed, the Court should give preclusive effect to the final Agent
Orange judgment that dismissed any and all subsequent claims
against the manufacturers. In making this argument, the Agent
Orange manufacturers relied on a well-established line of cases
dealing with the binding nature and finality of judgments. 20 6
In addition, the manufacturers argued that absent class
members should have been precluded from collaterally attacking on
the grounds of inadequate representation a class action settlement
that trial and appellate courts had previously approved. 20 7 If the
Court approved such collateral attack, the manufacturers argued,
202. Id., at 277.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
207. Mullenix, supra note 128, at 277.
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there would be no finality to class action settlements, and every such
settlement would be vulnerable to adequacy attacks by disgruntled
20 8
class and non-class members.
On the other hand, the objecting Vietnam veterans argued that
they should not have been barred from bringing their own claims for
injuries that manifested only after the class settlement date. 20 9 They
contended that giving preclusive effect to the Agent Orange settlement
would deny them their due process rights because the future
claimants were not adequately represented in the original
settlement. 210 They argued that preclusion doctrine should never
operate to bar a collateral attack against the adequacy of class
representation and that recent federal appellate decisions supported
21
the right to this kind of collateral attack. '
On the facts, the Vietnam veterans argued that they were
denied all four forms of due process rights that adhere in, and are
required by, class action litigation. These fundamental due process
rights include the right to notice, the opportunity to opt-out, the
opportunity to be heard, and the right to adequate representation. In
considering these competing claims of the Agent Orange
manufacturers and the Vietnam veterans, the Court had the
opportunity to revisit landmark class action decisions in which the
Court has articulated the due process basis for class litigation, most
notably Hansberry v. Lee and Phillips Petroleum Company v.
2 12
Shutts.
In Hansberry, the Court set forth basic propositions relating to
the binding nature of representative actions. 2 13 Generally, the Court
concluded that persons with conflicting interests who are not
adequately represented in a prior action cannot be bound by that prior
judgment. 21 4
The Agent Orange manufacturers sought to have
Hansberry distinguished on its facts as well as because the case was
decided prior to the modern class action rule. 21 5 The Vietnam
veterans, on the other hand, contended the Hansberry principles were
completely on point with their argument that preclusion doctrine

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 277-78.
See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797

(1985).
213. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45-46.
214. Id.

215. Mullenix, supra note 128, at 278.
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should not be applied to persons not adequately represented in the
2 16
original representative action.
In Shutts, the Court recognized that notice, the opportunity to
be heard, the opportunity to opt-out, and the presence of adequate
representation are the fundamental due process components of class
litigation. 217 However, the petitioners and respondents in the Agent
Orange appeal disagreed as to whether a fair reading of Shutts
permits collateral attack of a class judgment based on the grounds of a
lack of adequate representation. 218
The Agent Orange veterans
contended that the Shutts decision itself illustrated just such a
collateral attack. 21 9 The Agent Orange manufacturers, in contrast,
contended that the absent class members' due process rights should be
protected by the initial certifying court and not by collateral review. 220
The Stephenson and Issacson cases were further complicated
by years of intervening and developing class action jurisprudence,
most notably the Court's decisions in Amchem and Ortiz. 221 In both
cases, the Court expansively discussed fundamental class action
principles, including the requirements for adequate representation, in
the context of settlement classes, focusing on the problem of conflicts
222
of interest.
The Agent Orange manufacturers contended that it was
illegitimate for the Second Circuit or any other court to retrospectively
apply the Amchem and Ortiz principles to invalidate the previous
findings of adequacy in the Agent Orange settlement. 223 The Agent
Orange veterans, on the other hand, contended that neither Amchem
nor Ortiz announced new or novel propositions of law concerning
adequacy. Instead, they argued that the basic principles relating to
intraclass conflicts existed at the time of the Agent Orange settlement.
Under existing adequacy principles at that time, they argued, the
courts could not have made a finding of adequate representation when
the future Agent Orange claimants comprised a part of the settlement
class.224

216. Id.
217. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-814.
218. Mullenix, supranote 128, at 278.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815 (1999).
222. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-2; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856.
223. Mullenix, supra note 128, at 278.
224. Id.
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Furthermore, since the Agent Orange settlement, federal
appellate courts have considered the permissible scope of collateral
attacks against class action settlements. 225 In particular, the Agent
Orange manufacturers cited the Ninth Circuit's Epstein decision for
this proposition: "Due process requires that an absent class member's
right to adequate representation be protected by the adoption of the
appropriate procedures by the certifying court and by the courts that
review its determinations; due process does not require collateral
'
second-guessing of those determinations and that review. "226
The Agent Orange manufacturers contended that Judge
Weinstein did adopt and provide all appropriate procedures to protect
the rights of absent class members; the Vietnam veterans contended
this fundamentally was not true. The veterans contended that the
Epstein decision reaffirmed the right of collateral attack for a lack of
adequacy and that they received no appropriate procedures protecting
227
their rights.
D. Repercussions of the Court's Nondecision In Agent Orange
The Supreme Court ultimately did not decide the various
important issues in the Agent Orange appeal; the Court split evenly,
with Justice Stevens recusing himself from the case. 228 In a twoparagraph per curiam decision, the divided Court vacated the Second
Circuit's judgment with respect to Issacson's case but affirmed the
230
Second Circuit's judgment with respect to Stephenson's case.
The Court's failure to decide the issues in the Agent Orange
appeal was not only disappointing, but it also left class action
practitioners in the lurch concerning preservation of class action
settlements, rendering settlements continuously vulnerable to
225. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179
F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
226. Epstein, 179 F.3d at 648.
227. Mullenix, supra note 128, at 278-79.
228. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson (In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig.), 539 U.S. 111,
112 (2003).
230. Id. Issacson's case was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of the
Court's decision in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002), because of the
means by which the case had been removed to federal court. Id. The net result was that the
Court effectively upheld Stephenson's right to bring a collateral attack against the Agent Orange
settlement on the various grounds approved by the Second Circuit.
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collateral attack. Fundamentally, the Court had the opportunity to
determine the scope and effect of res judicata principles as they apply
to class action settlements and the permissible extent to which such
settlements may be challenged through subsequent collateral attacks.
The Court had before it an interesting and compelling battle of
competing fairness concerns.
The Agent Orange appeal embodied two countervailing policy
concerns, both of which were grounded in due process considerations.
The first set of policy concerns undergirds the doctrine of res judicata:
namely, that there is finality to judgments. Particularly for class
action defendants, both the sanctity of res judicata principles and the
binding effect of class action judgments are paramount considerations
in negotiating and concluding class litigation.
Defendants desire finality of judgments and an end to
litigation; the binding effect of class judgments is a due process
protection for both plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants cannot
achieve this goal if class action settlements are open-ended and
vulnerable to collateral attack many years after courts have approved
and implemented a class action settlement. For the Agent Orange
manufacturers, fairness compelled an end to this litigation after the
Agent Orange settlement was negotiated, approved, implemented, and
terminated. 23 1 An array of amicus briefs in support of the petitioners
urged the Court to contemplate the sweeping effect that an adverse
232
decision would have on the sanctity of all future class settlements.
On the other hand, the second category of policy concerns
centers on the due process rights of absent class members. The
essence and utility of class action litigation is that it is
representational litigation permitting the aggregation of the hundreds
or thousands of similar claims. However, courts have repeatedly
stressed that the rights of absent class members to have their claims
resolved in a fair manner, of which adequate representation is a
fundamental predicate, must not be sacrificed by simply maintaining
233
the efficiency of class litigation.
Under this view, no absent class member should be bound to a
judgment in which the class member did not receive notice, did not
have an opportunity to be heard or opt-out, or was not adequately
represented. For Stephenson and Issacson, fairness compelled that
they should not have been bound by the Agent Orange settlement or
barred from pursuing their tort claims because their injuries

231. Mullenix, supra note 128, at 279.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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manifested after the settlement cutoff date in a class action in which
they contended their interests were not adequately represented.
E.

What the Agent Orange Appeal Teaches About After-the-Fact
Adequacy Determinations

The Agent Orange appeal embodied significant legal issues, but
the appeal also teaches useful lessons about the difficulties in
reconstructing adequacy determinations years later. Although the
settlement defenders repeatedly urged that numerous courts on
numerous occasions had reviewed adequacy of representation, what is
not known about those determinations is cause for concern.
Just exactly how probing and rigorous were the adequacy
determinations? What exactly did the parties proffer in support of the
adequacy determinations at every stage of the litigation, and how
carefully did the court weigh the evidence? Judge Pratt's initial order
certifying the class found adequacy of representation based on facts
that included an absence of any named class representative, and the
presence of class counsel who subsequently withdrew for managerial
234
and financial reasons.
By the time of the 2002-03 Agent Orange appeal, the Supreme
Court had an almost twenty-year trail of district court orders and
appellate decisions that recited conclusory findings of adequacy. 23 5
What was missing was any knowledge, understanding, or factual
record of how those adequacy inquiries were conducted, what evidence
was proffered and challenged, and how probing those inquiries were.
Should we be persuaded that adequacy concerns were sufficiently
addressed through Judge Weinstein's town meetings with veterans,
which was one of the major forums where some veterans raised their
concerns about lack of adequate representation for the currently
uninjured veterans?
Of course, if one subscribes to the notion that the only factor
that matters for the adequacy requirement is a determination whether
impermissible conflicts of interest exist, this simplifies the adequacy
inquiry radically. On the other hand, if one subscribes to the concept
that the adequacy requirement involves a more wide-ranging
consideration of factors, as I do, then the way in which litigants and
courts typically conduct this inquiry undermines the ability to
ascertain meaningful adequacy and thereby insulate settlements from
collateral attack. If the judicial system does not require a meaningful

234. See supra notes 163-169 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part III.

2004]

TAKING ADEQUACY SERIOUSLY

1733

examination of the adequacy requirement as well as the making of a
meaningful record, then future courts often have little to work with
other than conclusory, meaningless recitations of adequacy.
V. PRESCRIPTIVE STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR ASSESSING
ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION: ACTUAL AND NOT PRESUMED
ADEQUACY

It follows from the discussion above that in order to assure the
sanctity of settlement classes from vulnerability to collateral attack,
litigants and the judiciary have to take the adequacy requirement
more seriously. This involves more meaningful involvement of the
class representatives, more rigorous judicial scrutiny of proffered class
counsel and class representatives, and more effort on the part of
everyone involved in class action litigation.
To begin, courts need to assess the adequacy requirement at
the outset of the litigation (at the front end) and not during the
development of the litigation or at the time of settlement (the back
end). This conclusion is impelled by the notion that absent class
members must be protected from the very outset of the litigation and
not at any later point.2 3 6 An early and meaningful determination of
adequacy is necessary because by the time "adequate" class counsel or
"adequate" class representatives are interjected into the proceedings,
it may too late to protect the interests of absent class members.
Having a determination of adequate class representation from the
outset protects against the problem of "closing the barn door after the
horse has bolted."
Second, courts need to abandon the hopelessly outdated and
inapplicable Surowitz paradigm for evaluating the adequacy of the
class representative. 237
Mrs. Surowitz and her son-in-law Mr.
Brilliant should be banished to the quaint, less-litigious era from
which they surfaced. 238 The ghost of Mrs. Surowitz should no longer
be permitted to provide the baseline measure of adequacy. In the
modern age of settlement classes, courts need to move beyond the view
that treats class representatives as "standing" ciphers or potted
plants.
Similarly, courts should eschew presumptive findings of
adequacy, as they often do with regard to the adequacy of class
236. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858 ("Rule 23 requires protections under subdivisions (a) and (b)
against inequity and potential inequity at the precertification stage, quite independently of the
required determination at postcertification fairness review under subdivision (e) that any
settlement is fair in an overriding sense.").
237. See supra notes -99 and accompanying text.
238. Id.
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counsel, and in most jurisdictions, with regard to the class
representatives. No one should get a free pass on the adequacy
requirement.
Third, courts need to abandon their standard rote and
conclusory recitations of findings of adequacy 239 and articulate
meaningful standards for the assessment of this requirement. These
standards need actaully to relate to a fundamental understanding of
what adequate class counsel and class representatives should be and
how these representatives should conduct themselves. Adequacy
standards need to be tied to their due process underpinnings and to
due process concerns of representational litigation. Thus, courts need
to go beyond the simple inquiry of whether conflicts of interest exist,
either as between counsel and the absent class members or as between
the representatives and the absent class members.
Fourth, because so much of the adequacy jurisprudence focuses
on the single factor of conflicts of interest, courts need to develop more
consistent jurisprudence concerning conflicts of interest that serve to
disable a proposed class counsel or class representative from
representing the class. The decisional law relating to conflicts of
interest is muddied at best and inconsistent at worst. The decisional
law is unclear as to whether litigants must demonstrate an actual or
potential conflict of interest. 240 In addition, existing doctrinal law is
entirely unhelpful in assisting litigants or the court in identifying and
understanding when a disabling conflict of interest is present, apart
241
from egregious examples such as the conflict embodied in Amchem.
Fifth, courts need to engage in meaningful measures to
implement these adequacy standards. As discussed below, this effort
involves more than cursory review of pro-offered, self-serving
statements of adequacy (on the part of class counsel and class
representatives). Courts need to probe beyond patently-coached class
representatives who recite four-minute scripts in which they testify to
their own desire to vigorously represent the class and their personal
freedom from conflicts of interest without any understanding of the
script. Courts need to change the ways in which they consider
adequacy, and they need to do so at the outset of the litigation. Courts
should be required to develop a factual, evidentiary record on the
adequacy requirement and to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law based on those facts. Finally, the practice of plaintiff-drafted class
239. See supra Parts II, III.
240. See FED. R. Civ. P. R. 23(g) advisory committee's note to 2003 amendments (suggesting
that potential conflicts of interest count as a disabling factor in assessing appointment of class
counsel).
241. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 625-28 (1997); see also supra Part III.A.
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certification orders that recite conclusory findings of adequacy that
simply repeat Rule 23(a)(4) 242 similarly should be banished.
Standardsfor EvaluatingAdequacy of Class Representation

A.

1. Adequacy of Class Counsel
As indicated above, judicial assessment of the adequacy of class
counsel almost always has consisted of a pro forma, cursory blessing
2 43
by the court as to whoever appeared in court as counsel of record.
Prior to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, judicial "scrutiny" of class
counsel was intertwined with the court's assessment of the Rule
As stated previously, judicial
23(a)(4) threshold requirements.
decisions essentially set forth three chief criteria for evaluating
attorney adequacy: (1) experience, (2) resources, and (3) conflicts of
interest.2 44 Moreover, courts to date have rarely, if ever, found counsel
of
not adequate to represent the class, either due to an abundance
245
professional courtesy or lack of serious regard for the inquiry.
While the adequacy requirement for class counsel remains
incorporated in Rule 23(a)(4), assessment of proposed class counsel is
now subject to new criteria set forth in Rule 23(g).2 46 In addition to
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
(1)

See supraPart II.B.3.
See supranote 59 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). The Rule provides:
Appointing Class Counsel.

(A) Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must appoint
class counsel.
(B) An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class.
(C) In appointing class counsel, the court
(i) must consider:
. the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the
action,
. counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims
of the type asserted in the action,
counsel's knowledge of the applicable law, and
the resources counsel will commit to representing the class;
(ii) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class;
(iii) may direct potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent
to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and nontaxable costs; and
(iv) may make further orders in connection with the appointment.
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setting forth the fundamental proposition that an attorney appointed
to serve as class counsel "must fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class, '247 the new provision also lists four criteria that
courts must consider for assessing the adequacy of proposed class
counsel. 248 These include two of the three criteria historically
249
recognized in class action jurisprudence: experience and resources.
In addition, courts must consider "the work counsel has done in
identifying and investigating potential claims in the action," as well as
the counsel's knowledge of the applicable law. 250 Notably absent from
251
this list is any inquiry into potential or actual conflicts of interest.
The new Rule 23(g), however, seemingly vests judges with
broad, wide-ranging authority to force proposed class counsel to
answer any inquiries that the court might have relating to
appointment as class counsel. In the broadest conferral of a judge's
authority to inquire into matters relating to class counsel
appointment, new Rule 23(g) also permits, but does not require, courts
to consider "any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class." 252 Further
expanding the scope of the judge's authority, Rule 23(g) permits the
court to "direct" potential class counsel to provide any information on
any subject pertinent to the appointment. 253 Finally, new Rule 23(g)
also permits the court to direct potential class counsel to offer to the
court proposed terms for attorney fees and nontaxable costs. 254 In
applying Rule 23(g), the Advisory Committee Note indicates that in
evaluating prospective class counsel, the court should "weigh all
' 255
pertinent factors.

Id. (emphasis added).
247. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
248. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. The Advisory Committee Note, rather than the rule provision, makes reference to the
obligation of class counsel to represent the interests of all class members, as opposed to the
potentially conflicting interests of individual class members. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g) advisory
committee's note. Although the Note makes reference to potentially conflicting interests among
class members, the Note does not discuss the parallel problem of potential or actual conflicts of
interests as between class counsel and class members.
252. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(ii). The Advisory Committee Note to this provision does not
provide many examples of the type of additional information the court might seek, but it does
indicate that it might include any agreements concerning the prospective award of attorney fees
or the existence and conduct of parallel litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee's
note.

253. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii).
254. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iv).
255. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee's note.
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The Rule 23(g) codification of standards for the appointment of
counsel is a tremendous improvement over the patchwork quilt of
standards in pre-existing case law. Subdivision (g) now provides a
laundry checklist of both required and permissive factors that a court
may take into account when assessing the qualifications of class
counsel. 256 The inclusion of broad authority to inquire into any
matters pertinent to the appointment gives judges a rule-based text
from which to conduct a meaningful determination of the adequacy of
class counsel.
Rule 23(g) is a vast improvement over the inchoate universe of
pre-existing case law, but the Rule 23(g) provisions for appointment of
class counsel are not without their own set of potential problems.
Rule 23(g)(2) now permits a court to designate interim counsel to act
on behalf of the putative class before determining whether to certify
the action as a class action. 2 57 The rule itself does not specify the time
period after a class action is filed in which the court is to determine
and appoint class counsel, 259 although amended Rule 23(c) indicates
that a court order certifying a class must appoint class counsel under
26 0
Rule 23(g).
The Advisory Committee promulgated this provision in
recognition of the situation that multiple attorneys might apply for
appointment as class counsel. In order for competing class counsel to
conduct initial discovery and develop their applications for
appointment, the rule now permits courts to appoint interim counsel
while these activities are being conducted. 26 1 The Advisory Committee
Note cautions that the interim counsel, who presumably is not subject
to a full-blown adequacy inquiry (or any adequacy inquiry at all), is
26 2
obligated during this period to act in the best interests of the class.

256. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C).
257. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2)(A).
259. The newly promulgated standard for timing of the class certification decision is "at an
early practicable time." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
260. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
261. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2)(A).
262. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee's note, which states:
Rule 23(g)(2)(A) authorizes the court to designate interim counsel to act on behalf of
the putative class before the certification decision is made. Failure to make the formal
designation does not prevent the attorney who filed the action from proceeding in it.
Whether or not formally designated interim counsel, an attorney who acts on behalf of
the class before certification must act in the best interests of the class as a whole. For
example, an attorney who negotiates a pre-certification settlement must seek a
settlement that is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class.
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Notwithstanding the Advisory Note's cautionary warning
regarding interim class counsel, the specter of some attorney or group
of attorneys developing class litigation without prior juridical scrutiny
while a final determination of appointment of counsel is pending
raises some cause for concern. Although the Advisory Note counsels
that interim counsel have duties to the class, who will be guarding the
guardians during this period?
2. Adequacy of the Class Representative
While the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 are a significant
advance in providing standards for appointment of class counsel and
assuring adequacy, Rule 23 does not anywhere discuss standards for
assessing the adequacy of the class representative. Hence, Rule 23
currently seems to lend at least tacit endorsement to the proposition
that class representatives are not all that important. This dichotomy
between the relative centrality and importance of class counsel and
the class representative now has been given additional support by the
Rule's fulsome consideration of class counsel standards, 263 and
corresponding silence with regard to the class representatives.
Someone needs to resolve the debate concerning the
significance and role of class representatives and to choose between
the potted-plant theory and active-fiduciary theory. Because the
majority of courts currently hew to the potted-plant theory, this
contributes to laziness with, inattention to, and disregard of the class
representatives. On the other hand, those courts that subscribe to the
fiduciary theory have provided a large array of possible pertinent
264
factors that have bearing on the adequacy assessment.
As I have argued, I subscribe to the fiduciary theory of the
class representative because it comports with the due process
understanding of class action litigation as representational litigation.
In light of this belief, perhaps the rulemakers, on the next cycle of
Rule 23 amendments, 2 65 ought to seriously consider enhancing Rule 23

263. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g)(1)(C).

264. See supra notes 75-86.
265. After twelve continuous years of amending Rule 23, one ventures this suggestion to the
Advisory Committee hesitantly. I also am not an advocate either of lengthy rules or rules with
lists of factors. However, the Advisory Committee now has gone down that path with Rule 23(g).
Moreover, standards relating to the adequacy of class representatives cry out for some uniform
treatment across federal courts, which is unlikely to occur in absence of a rule.
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with a set of factors for courts to consider in evaluating the adequacy
26 6
of class representatives.
This task should not be difficult to accomplish. The exercise
parallels the Advisory Committee's codification of standards for
appointment of counsel, and those standards are largely drawn from
pre-existing decisional law. Because a parallel and substantial body of
case law articulates standards for assessing the adequacy of class
representatives, there is good reason to assume that the Advisory

Committee is highly capable of similarly codifying these principles as
well. Moreover, such a rule amendment will provide a rule basis for
litigants and courts to evaluate adequacy of class representatives and
will assist in ending the disarray and disagreement across the federal
courts as to what counts in ascertaining class representative
adequacy.
If, on the other hand, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
were to conclude that the only relevant consideration for determining
the adequacy of class representatives is an impermissible conflict of
interest, the adequacy determination would still be assisted if Rule 23
or the Advisory Committee Note so indicated.
B. Implementation of the Standardsfor Assessing Adequacy of Class
Representation
Brevity is certainly possible when outlining recommendations
for implementation of a meaningful adequacy standard in the class
certification process. Essentially, these suggestions simply may be
distilled: everyone needs to take the adequacy requirement seriously
and everyone needs actually to perform his or her own job.
1. Class Counsel - Implementing Adequacy
First, class counsel need to take the adequacy of the class
representative seriously and to take all measures to ensure an
adequate class representative's presence in the class. At the outset,
this entails refraining from solicitation of class clients. This further
means discussing with an existing client the possibility of pursuing a
class action, the nature and function of the class action, and the class
representative's role in the litigation. Class representatives should
knowingly consent to undertaking the role of fiduciary for the class.
The plaintiffs law firm Lief, Cabraser engages in a comparable
266. Based on my experience of listening to Advisory Committee discussions and debates
over the years, it is my impression that judges prefer rules with standards and guidance for their
decisionmaking.
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exercise, requiring its class representatives to sign a multiple-page
document that discusses both the concept of the class action and the
class representative's role. This is a laudable project.
Class representatives should actively be involved in the
development and progress of the litigation. This means that counsel
should furnish class representatives pleadings, motions and papers in
the action as they are generated and before counsel files documents
with the court or opposing counsel. Counsel should involve the class
representatives in decisionmaking regarding the class action and
should educate the class representatives as to the nature of the claims
that are pleaded, possible defenses to the claims, and the damages
aspects of the litigation. Class representatives do not need to be
experts in the law, but they do need to have a layperson's
understanding of the litigation that is sufficient to exercise
independent control over the attorneys and to enable them to act in
the best interest of the entire class.
Counsel need to prepare and make the class representative
available for deposition, trial, and even settlement conferences.
Needless to say, class representatives need to be informed about
ongoing settlement negotiations and the nature and content of
possible settlement agreements.
In short, class counsel should take all steps to demonstrate
both to the defendants and to the court that the class representative is
acting as an independent fiduciary and that he or she has not ceded
control of the litigation to the attorneys. Not only do these activities
comport with a due process understanding of the class action, but they
also are in the plaintiffs counsel's interest insofar as they will insulate
the class representatives from challenges as to adequacy.
Regarding class counsel's adequacy, class counsel should
properly and completely recite their own ability to serve as class
counsel. With Rule 23(g) now in effect, it remains to be seen how
courts will implement the new requirements. In making applications
for position as class counsel, attorneys should ensure their proffer
contains full and complete disclosure of all supporting evidence of
competency, experience, resources, and conflicts. Class counsel should
be forthcoming with such disclosures rather than obstructionist, and
they should be responsive to all requests for information, clarification,
and problem solving asked for by the parties or the court.
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Defense Counsel - Implementing Adequacy

Defense counsel have a somewhat complicated position
regarding the adequacy requirement for class certification. If class
counsel seek certification of a litigation class, then defense counsel
typically will seek to challenge the representatives' adequacy. In such
situations, defense counsel have little interest in curing adequacy
defects; inadequate class counsel or class representatives form a basis
for denial of class certification or reversal on appeal. In other
situations, defense counsel may actually desire adequacy-challenged
counsel or representatives in order to secure an advantageous
negotiation and bargaining position. 268 Furthermore, defense counsel
may desire and approve certain actions by class counsel, such as
successive repleading of the class complaint to eliminate segments of
the class or class claims that might reflect negatively on class
counsel's adequacy of representation (but redound to the defendant's
advantage).
In the context of settlement classes, defendants have a
congruent interest with plaintiffs and the court in ensuring adequacy
of class representation. The problem, however, is that until the
parties enter into settlement negotiations, defense counsel have little
incentive or opportunity to assist in ensuring adequate representation
by class representatives. It is not defense counsel's duty to furnish
class representatives with pleadings and other papers or to educate
continuously class representatives about ongoing litigation.
Defense attorneys can assist in ensuring adequacy of
representation by class counsel throughout the settlement negotiation
and consummation process. This requires defense counsel to refrain
from suggesting or participating in collusive or ethically-challenged
deals, self-serving settlements, or settlements that compromise the
interests of segments of the class. Defense counsel equally need to be
sensitive to conflicts of interest and should negotiate settlements in
good faith without compromising the interests of one segment of a
class to the detriment of another segment of the class.
3. The Judiciary - Implementing Adequacy
The judiciary can assist in implementing a robust adequacy
standard through a few simple measures that are not unduly
burdensome and would not overtax even the most resource-strapped
state judge.
This requires a serious belief in the adequacy

268. See Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 63-66.
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requirement, an understanding of the due process nature of the
requirement, an understanding of its importance in protecting the
interests of absent class members, and a consequent commitment to a
rigorous examination of adequacy concerns.
Judges should be encouraged to refrain from certifying class
actions on paper records or on legal argument from counsel. Either
practice is insufficient to permit meaningful examination and
Surely, attentive listening does not
discussion of adequacy issues.
require a vast expenditure of judicial resources. Instead, judges at
least should permit, and likely should require, live testimony from
proffered class representatives. Such testimony will enable judges to
assess better the class representative's knowledge and understanding
of class claims, as well as the representative's understanding of his or
her role as a fiduciary. Such testimony enables the court to better
assess the extent to which the class representatives can carry out
their roles as independent protectors of absent class members or the
extent to which the class representatives have ceded control of the
litigation to class counsel. As is well known, class certification
hearings are not subject to the ordinary rules of evidence. There is no
reason why a judge should not question actively proffered class
representatives in addition to questions from counsel. In this regard,
judges should probe beyond coached recitations by class
representatives concerning their allegiance to the class. Again, these
simple measures should not impose burdens on judges.
Courts should entertain defense cross-examination of class
representatives in a meaningful and attentive fashion, and they
should not dismiss such inquiries out of hand. Courts should permit
defense counsel to make full record of adequacy issues and, if crossexamination reveals problems relating to adequacy, then courts
should not certify reflexively such class representatives without
further inquiry. Permitting defense attorneys to make a sufficient
record of adequacy issues also imposes no additional burdens on
judicial officers.
With regard to adequacy of class counsel, courts should
implement Rule 23(g) seriously and meaningfully and probe beyond
self-serving affidavits in support of appointment as class counsel.
Judges should inquire into the nature of class counsel's experience,
resources, and other pertinent information. Judges need not conduct
independent inquiries, but a probing examination of credentials will
serve to ascertain true class identity.
Courts should issue class certification orders that include
findings on the adequacy issue and that do not merely recite the
language of Rule 24(a)(4). To this end, courts should be encouraged to
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cease the practice of requesting plaintiff-drafted certification orders
This
that result in conclusory findings of adequacy. 269
recommendation does require judicial time and effort; considering the
stakes involved and the due process basis, class claimants desire no
less judicial energy to ensure fair and adequate representation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of "under the radar" litigation exacerbates all
the problems relating to current and future settlement classes. It is
well known that much of what occurs in the class action arena is
conducted under the radar. That is, many class action suits involve
ongoing litigation in which events and outcomes never result in
reported orders, decisions, or appellate opinions. Moreover, empirical
research into class action litigation is notoriously difficult to conduct,
and when such research is attempted, the results may be limited in
271
scope and application.
Consequently, we lack significant information about the true
incidence of class action filings, disposition of motions, class
certification orders, dismissals, settlements, or compromises. The
universe of reported case law provides only a partial insight into class
action litigation; the working hypothesis is that reported cases are the
proverbial tip of the iceberg.
In addition, analysis and discussion of class action litigation
obsessively focuses on federal class actions, slighting any analysis of
This is a tremendous oversight; a
state class action litigation.
substantial number of states have high volumes of class action
litigation, which is apparent simply by the number of reported
decisions. 272 Similar to the federal phenomenon, however, much of

269. See supra Part II.B.3.
271. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (1999); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET
AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996), at

http://classaction.findlaw.com/research/ficca4.pdf.
272. See LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2000);
SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LAW: A
REPORT OF THE STATE LAWS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CLASS ACTIONS AND DERIVATIVE SUITS

COMMITTEE (Thomas R. Grande ed., 2003).
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what happens in state class action litigation is also accomplished
under the radar and never results in reported decisions.
If both federal and state class action litigation is largely underreported, then we can only piece together a quilt of anecdotal
information about the true conduct of class litigation that occurs
under the radar. Further, if reported decisions suggest that attention
to adequacy issues is inadequate as evidenced through the decisions'
certification orders, then we should be especially concerned in the
common situation where no reported decisions exist to subject judicial
activity to transparency.
The problem with the adequacy determination is that
historically neither courts nor litigants have taken the adequacy
requirement very seriously, and this in turn has inspired rote
73
incantations of conclusory or presumptive assertions of adequacy.
Adequacy has been a kind of free-rider on the freight train barreling
towards class certification or approval of the settlement class. None of
the actors in the system has a particular incentive to dwell on
adequacy concerns at the outset of the litigation, during development
of the lawsuit, or especially when the parties have converged on an
agreed settlement. In sum, no actor has a vested interest in adequacy
until it becomes an issue, and this is usually too late. Similar to the
problem of being partially pregnant, it is difficult to construct
adequacy after-the-fact.
To assure that settlement classes in the future are both viable
and enduring, all actors involved with class litigation need to assert
more effort in ensuring actual, and not presumed, compliance with the
rule, especially with regard to the adequacy of representation
requirement. The historically prevailing ethos that the adequacy
determination somehow is not all that important, coupled with ritual
obeisance that it is, needs reformation.
The effort to ensure meaningful adequacy at the front end of
class action litigation is in the interests of all actors in the class action
arena. Assuring meaningful adequacy at the front end of class action
litigation enables and secures the common goal of all: a fair and
reasonable settlement class that is capable of withstanding collateral
attack. Furthermore, ensuring meaningful adequacy at the front end
of class action litigation should avoid and eliminate precisely the type
of collateral attack involved in the Agent Orange class settlement, one
27 4
that occurred twenty years after consummation of the deal.

273. See supra notes 59, 70-73 and accompanying text.
274. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson (In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig.), 539 U.S.
111, 111 (2003).

